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AN IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FREEDOM FROM SEXUAL
HARASSMENT: THE SOLUTION FOR HARASSED
TENANTS WHERE THE FAIR HOUSING ACT HAS FAILED
Theresa Keeley*
Although sexual harassment in the workplace is recognized as a problem, sexual
harassment in housing has largely been ignored. When confronting sexual har-
assment in housing, courts have borrowed standards for sexual harassment in the
workplace. Criticism of this practice exists; however this Article examines the real
source of the problem: bringing sexual harassment claims under the Fair Housing
Act. Specifically, this Article shows how and why the Fair Housing Act fails to ad-
dress the problem of sexual harassment in housing. To remedy this failure, this
Article proposes an "implied warranty of freedom from sexual harassment" that
both restores the tenant's loss of control and provides a nonjudicial, self-help rem-
edy to the tenant.
INTRODUCTION
Although sexual harassment in the workplace is recognized as a
problem, sexual harassment in housing has largely been ignored.
Several factors contribute to its invisibility. Most importanly, hous-
ing, as a civil rights issue, does not garner much attention;1 as the
United States Supreme Court has noted, there is no constitutional
right to decent shelter. Unlike harassment in the workplace, there
has been no large-scale publicity surrounding the issue, such as
there was with Supreme Court confirmation hearings of Clarence
Thomas,3 the Navy's Tailhook Scandal,4 or Paula Jones's lawsuit
* Law Clerk to the Honorable Deborah T. Poritz, Chief Justice of the New Jersey
Supreme Court; J.D. 2004, University of Pennsylvania Law School; B.A. 1998, Colgate Uni-
versity. I wish to thank Professors Gideon Parchomovsky and Wendell Pritchett for their
comments and criticisms and Michael N. Fine for his suggestions and support.
1. Michelle Adams, Knowing Your Place: Theorizing Sexual Harassment at Home, 40 ARIz.
L. REV. 17, 29-30 (1998).
2. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 73, 74 (1972); see also Beverly Balos, A Man's Home is
His Castle: How the Law Shelters Domestic Violence and Sexual Harassment, 23 ST. Louis U. PUB.
L. REv. 56, 73-74 (2004).
3. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Gender, Race, and the Politics of Supreme Court Appointments:
The Import of the Anita Hill/Clarence Thomas Hearings the View to and from Congress, 65S. CAL. L.
REV. 1497 (1992); see also Dennis DeConcini, Examining the Judicial Nomination Process: The
Politics of Advice and Consent, 34 ARz. L. REV. 1 (1992).
4. The Tailhook scandal involved sexual harassment as well as sexual assault. Vicki
Schultz, Reconceptualizing Sexual Harassment, 107 YALE L.J. 1683, 1693-94 (1998). See J. Rich-
ard Chema, Arresting "Tailhook": The Prosecution of Sexual Harassment in the Military, 140 MIL.
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against President Bill Clinton.5 Moreover, the nature of the prob-
lem itself and its disproportionate effect on women of lower
economic means perpetuate its invisibility. Finally, from a legal
standpoint, the majority of the claims for sexual harassment in
housing brought thus far under the Fair Housing Act ("FHA") 6
have been unsuccessful. The FHA says nothing about sexual har-
assment. Therefore, in adjudicating claims of sexual harassment in
housing, courts have "borrowed" Title VII's interpretation of what
qualifies as sexual harassment in the workplace, presumably be-
cause Title VII and the FlA use similar "terms and conditions"
language!
This Article argues that because tenants who are sexually har-
assed by their landlords have no effective remedy, sexual
harassment of tenants needs to be recognized as a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability-the "implied warranty of freedom
from sexual harassment" ("IWFSH"). The IWFSH reflects the
power imbalance that exists between landlord and tenant and takes
into account the loss of control the tenant feels when harassed.
The IWFSH addresses the harm to the tenant affected and protects
future tenants by serving as a deterrent.
Part I introduces the problem of sexual harassment in the hous-
ing context, describes how it arises, and explains why tenants do
not usually bring claims. Part II provides an overview of sexual har-
assment as a form of sex-based discrimination under Title VII and
describes the framework under which claims are brought. Part III
discusses the original purpose behind the Fair Housing Act and its
legislative history. Part IV details how and why courts adjudicating
sexual harassment claims have looked to Title VII for guidance,
beginning with the Sixth Circuit in Shelihammer v. Lewallen.s
Part V explores how applying Title VII to housing claims exacer-
bates problems like class bias that are already plaguing sexual
harassment jurisprudence. It discusses differences between the
L. REv. 1 (1993), for a Navy Lieutenant Commander's view of Tailhook and the Navy's re-
sponse to the situation as well as whether substantive changes in military law are required to
deal with sexual harassment.
5. Jones v. Clinton, 990 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Ark. 1998); see Barbara Palmer et al., Low-
Life-Sleazy-Big-Haired-Trailer-Park Girl v. The President: The Paula Jones Case and the Law of Sexual
Harassment, 9 Am. U.J. GENDER SOC. POL'v & L. 283 (2001) (discussing the merits of Paula
Jones' sexual harassment claim in contrast to the media's suggestion that the claim had no
merit, the ways in which the case highlights the power imbalance inherent in sexual harass-
ment cases, and the appropriateness of summary judgment to dismiss sexual harassment
claims).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-19 (2000).
7. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. No. 84-3573, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir. July 31, 1985). See discussion infra Part IV.
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workplace and the home, such as how an employer has incentives
to stop harassment, and how a harassed tenant not only must en-
dure the pain of harassment but must also pay the harasser. Part V
ultimately concludes that why, rather than where, the harassment
occurs is most important.
Part VI discusses, but rejects, proposals to bring sexual harass-
ment claims under those parts of the FHA that differ from Title
VII. The FHA was never intended to address the problem of sexual
harassment, but instead seeks to prevent exclusion by prohibiting
the refusal to sell or rent a home to someone based on an individ-
ual's membership in a specific "group"-based on race, national
origin, sex, or disability. Unlike the context that spawned the FHA,
a landlord's motivation in sexually harassing a tenant is not to drive
the tenant away, but to take advantage of a situation: to maintain a
rent paying tenant while exerting additional control over her.9
Part VII introduces and discusses a three-part remedy for the
harassed tenant centered on the IWFSH. First, leases should con-
tain a sexual harassment provision explaining a tenant's right to be
free from sexual harassment and the steps she can take if she is
harassed. The inclusion of such a provision in the lease will also
serve as a deterrent to the landlord, similar to the lead paint warn-
ings currently found in leases. Second, the tenant must be able to
assert her rights without risking eviction. This can be achieved by
incorporating a requirement of a harassment-fee environment as
part of the implied warranty of habitability-the IWFSH. The
IWFSH will also enable a tenant to withhold rent to force a change
in behavior without resorting to litigation. Additionally, a tenant
can also assert a breach of implied warranty of habitability offen-
sively. Either method provides a way to regain control over a
situation in which the tenant has experienced a loss of control. Fi-
nally, the landlord's rental license should be suspended so that he
cannot collect rent from any property for a period of time. Doing
so not only recognizes sexual harassment as a societal harm, but
also deters the landlord from harassing again. Additionally, sus-
pending a landlord's ability to collect rent temporarily rather than
revoking the rental license altogether does not compromise other
tenants' housing.
9. This Article occasionally uses "women" as a substitute for "tenant," since the major-
ity of individuals facing sex-based harassment are women. Throughout this Article the term
"landlord" also includes those employed by the property owner such as the building man-
ager.
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Finally, this Article concludes by noting that the failure to pro-
vide tenants with an adequate remedy under the FHA affects both
tenants who bring claims under the FHA and those with claims
under state law. State courts have used interpretations of the FHA
to guide their own fair housing laws. This Article also posits that an
effective remedy is lacking because there is neither an equality law
prohibiting sexual harassment in general nor is there recognition
that housing is, or should be, a basic human right.
I. THE PROBLEM
The exact number of tenants facing sexual harassment at home
is unknown. The first and only nationwide survey of housing cen-
ters in 1987 detailed 288 incidents of sexual harassment.'
However, due to the fact that the ninety-six responding centers an-
swered the survey themselves and that sexual harassment in the
workplace and academia is underreported, it is more likely that
288 incidents represented only two to four percent of the actual
occurrences of sexual harassment."
Women facing sexual harassment are often reluctant to bring
claims against their harassers. In the housing context, this reluc-
tance is even more pronounced. Unlike the workplace, in which
women of all economic backgrounds can potentially suffer from
harassment, sexual harassment in housing disproportionately af-
fects women of lower economic means and women of color.
2
Women with greater economic means-who can purchase their
own homes-do not have to worry about sexual harassment at
home from a landlord. Furthermore, it is unlikely that a woman
already facing economic difficulties in her life will be eager to con-
front her harasser. 3 If she challenges the landlord, he may stop
10. Regina Cahan, Comment, Home is No Haven: An Analysis of Sexual Harassment in
Housing, 1987 Wis. L. REv. 1061, 1066 (1987).
11. Id. at 1069. For example, in 2003, 13,566 workplace sexual harassment complaints
were filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or with state and local fair
employment agencies. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, SEXUAL HARASS-
MENT CHARGES EEOC & FEPAs COMBINED: FY 1992-FY 2003 (2004), available at
http://www.eeoc.gov/stats/harass.htnl (on file with the University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform). It has also been estimated that one in every two women will experience sexu-
ally harassing behavior at some point during their working career. Kimberly T. Schneider et
al., Job-Related and Psychological Effects of Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Empirical Evidence
from Two Organizations, 82J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 401, 402 (1997).
12. Adams, supra note 1, at 30.
13. See Kathleen M. Ingram et al., The Relationship of Victimization Experiences to Psycho-
logical Well-Being Among Homeless Women and Loup-Income Housed Women, 43 J. COUNSELING
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making repairs, attempt to evict her, or blacklist her in the future."
A tenant with Section 8 housing, a federal government housing
subsidy which assists people of low income with rent," may also
fear she will lose certification or be unable to quickly find alterna-
tive housing. 6 For a mother, the predicament is even worse, as
finding low-income housing for families presents additional bur-
dens.
Cases of harassment in housing can come to light either because
(1) the landlord serves the victim with an eviction notice in retalia-
tion for refusing to accede to his demands or (2) the victim stops
paying rent in order to force the landlord to stop harassment and
the landlord responds with an eviction notice. This second sce-
nario puts harassed tenants in a terrible bind as it is the very failure
to pay rent that gives the landlord a non-discriminatory reason to
evict. A harassing landlord can simply claim that the sexual har-
assment allegations are untrue or irrelevant and that failure to pay
rent is the real reason for the eviction.
Sexual harassment claims do not receive the widespread atten-
tion they deserve because of the traumatizing nature of the issue
and the very limited legal services available to poor women. A
woman of low economic means is likely to seek help from a local
legal services organization because she cannot afford the services
of a private attorney. Legal services can only represent a small frac-
tion of the number of people who seek assistance." A tenant who is
PSYCHOL. 218 (1996), for a discussion of the impact of sexual harassment on low-income
and homeless women and how sexual harassment affects those women already living under
a high degree of stress.
14. Cahan, sup-a note 10, at 1067. Since 1980, the National Tenant Network has main-
tained a national "Tenant Performance Rating Service." Service subscribers can positively or
negatively "rate" their current tenants and view past ratings of potential tenants in twenty-
one states and Canada. See NATIONAL TENANT NETWORK website, at http://ntnnet.com/ (on
file with the University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform).
15. In order to qualify for Section 8, a "family's income may not exceed 50 percent of
the median income for the county or metropolitan area in which the family chooses to live."
U.S. DEPT. OF Hous. & URBAN DEV., HOUSING CHOICE VOUCHERS FACT SHEET, at http://
www.hud.gov/offices/pih/programs/hcv/about/factsheet.cfm (on file with the University
of MichiganJournal of Law Reform). Under the program, the tenant contributes 30 percent
of the gross income for the household to the payment of rent while the government pays the
landlord the remaining portion directly. Id. The tenant chooses the housing, subject to ap-
proval of the Housing Authority. Id.
16. See, e.g., Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10,
1989) (expressing tenants' fear that they would lose Section 8 certification if landlord
evicted them after wife refused landlord's sexual advances).
17. For example, in Philadelphia, a city with a population of 1.6 million, Community
Legal Services is the only organization in the city that handles housing problems for low-
income people. CITY OF PHILADELPHIA, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS: VITAL STATISTICS,
. 401WINTIER 2005]
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being harassed may not disclose the problem during a short tele-
phone conversation or brief walk-in encounter. Furthermore, if
housing problems are examined through the lens of structural
habitability, sexual harassment may not immediately come to the
attention of a legal services lawyer who is accustomed to dealing
with the structural problems that can affect leased premises. This is
especially true if the legal services lawyer is practicing in a state that
does not have a specific statute outlawing sexual harassment in
housing. 8 Furthermore, legal organizations that focus on "women's
issues" tend to concentrate on high impact litigation; the individ-
ual claims of a tenant facing eviction due to sexual harassment will
not likely appear on their radar screens unless the same problem
affects a great number of women.' 9 Therefore, a tenant being sexu-
ally harassed at her house may not receive the help she needs.
II. SEXUAL HARASSMENT JURISPRUDENCE: AN OVERVIEW
Beginning with Williams v. Saxby in 1976, courts have recognized
sexual harassment as a form of sex discrimination under Title VII.
20
Sexual harassment claims generally fall into two categories-quid
pro quo and hostile environment. However, the definitions of
"quid pro quo" or "hostile environment" are elusive. Additionally,
Title VII is concerned with injury to an individual based on his or
her membership in a group; therefore, many criticize Title VII's
ability to adequately address the personal harm the victim suffers.
Catherine MacKinnon describes quid pro quo sexual harass-
ment as the situation in which "an exchange of sex for economic
at http://www.phila.gov/faqs/index.html (on file with University of Michigan Journal of
Law Reform).
18. Michigan's Elliot Larsen Civil Rights Act categorizes landlord sexual harassment as
a form of sex-based housing discrimination. MICH COMp. LAws § 37.2103 (2003).
19. One notable exception is the National Organization of Women Legal Defense and
Education Fund's legal resource kit for sexual harassment in housing. Although this kit
recognizes the possibility of other avenues, it focuses on bringing a claim under the Fair
Housing Act. NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF WOMEN LEGAL DEFENSE AND EDUCATION FUND,
LEGAL RESOURCE KIT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING (2003), at http://
www.legalmomentum.org/pub/kits/SexHarassinHousingLRK0120.pdf (on file with the
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform). Additionally, Marcia Greenberger of the
National Women's Law Center in Washington, D.C. served as plaintiff's counsel in Honce v.
Vigil, I F.3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
20. 413 F. Supp. 654, 661 (D.D.C. 1976). This was the first case of what later came to
be known as "sexual harassment" in which a female employee alleged her supervisor har-
assed and humiliated her after she spurned his advances.
21. SeeJoanna Stromberg, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort?, 12 UCLA WOMEN'S
L.J. 317 (2003) (proposing a hybrid approach that combines Title VII and tort remedies).
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benefit is proposed and job retaliation for refusal of a sexual ad-
vance often results."22 For example, a supervisor asks a subordinate
for dates, engages in unwanted touching, or propositions her for
sex; if she refuses, she faces adverse employment consequences. In
Barnes v. Costle,23 Paulette Barnes's supervisor told her that her job
classification would be "enhanced" if she went on a date with him.
After refusing his advances, her job responsibilities were first cur-
tailed, and eventually her position was eliminated altogether.24
By contrast, a hostile environment sexual harassment claim
arises from a setting in which "sexually stereotyped insults and de-
meaning propositions ... illegally poison[] th[e] environment."
25
The United States Supreme Court first recognized hostile envi-
ronment claims in Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson in 1986.26 Hostile
environment discrimination usually manifests itself in the form of
crude language or sexually based epithets in an effort to make the
woman feel unwelcome. For example, in Ocheltree v. Scollon Produc-
tions, Inc.,27 male workers drove away Shari Ocheltree, the only
woman in the production room of a costume shop. 28 They used
daily sexual jokes and banter, showed her a picture of pierced geni-
talia, sang sexually explicit songs to her, and simulated sexual acts
on mannequins in front of her. One of Ms. Ocheltree's male co-
workers who observed the activity testified it was done purposefully
to bother her.3°
Although the behavior created a hostile work environment for
Ms. Ocheltree, its true purpose was to make the workplace so un-
pleasant as to drive her out of the production room. Carroll
Brodsky proposes that hostile sexual harassment claims such as this
should be viewed as "a means of competing for material re-
sources"31 and as a "mechanism for achieving exclusion and
protection of privilege in situations where there are no formal
mechanisms available."3 2 Furthermore, asJoseph A. Rice of the Jury
Research Institute notes, "[t]he rise in sexually hostile work envi-
22. Catherine A. MacKinnon, The Logic of Experience: Reflections on the Development of Sex-
ual Harassment Law, 90 GEO. L.J. 813,823 (2002).
23. 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
24. Id. at 985.
25. Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 944 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
26. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
27. 308 F.3d 351 (4th Cir. 2002), rev'd en banc, 335 F.3d 325 (4th Cir. 2003).
28. Id. at 367 (Michael,J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 353-54.
30. Id. at 354.
31. Schultz, supra note 4, at 1700.
32. Id. (quoting CARROLL BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER 4 (1976)).
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ronment claims appears to parallel the increased contact between
female employees in work settings that were predominantly male
in nature."3 3 In this way, sexual harassment reflects the desire to
keep the workplace free of women and therefore is often perpe-
trated by a woman's co-workers or peers. Although the sexual
harassment creates a hostile work environment, its ultimate pur-
pose is to exclude someone who differs from the rest.34 The most
obvious case of this kind of exclusionary harassment occurs when a
woman enters a field that has traditionally been the exclusive prov-
ince of men, such as a firefighting, construction, or welding. 5
However, in Burlington Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth, the Supreme
Court altered the "quid pro quo" versus "hostile environment"
framework.36 The Court held that harassment should be divided
between those instances in which tangible adverse employment
action was taken (quid pro quo) versus those in which it was only
threatened (hostile environment)." The Court defined "tangible
employment action" as a "significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with signifi-
cantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant
change in benefits."m If action was threatened, but not taken, the
plaintiff needed to prove the conduct was "severe or pervasive" in
order to prevail with a hostile environment claim.39 In doing so, the
Court decreased the scope of what qualified as quid pro quo har-
assment, thus making it more difficult for plaintiffs to succeed with
their sexual harassment claims.' °
33. Joseph A. Rice, Defending Sexual Harassment Cases in the 90s, at http://www.jri-
inc.com/article1.htm (on file with the University of MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
34. See Noah D. Zatz, Beyond the Zero-Sum Game: Toward Title VII Protection for Intergroup
Solidarity, 77 IND. L.J. 63 (2002) (criticizing courts' failure to see sexual harassment as an
attempt to exclude the "other").
35. See, e.g., Berkman v. City of New York, 580 E Supp. 226 (E.D.N.Y. 1983), affd, 755
E2d 913 (2d Cir. 1985) (finding sex discrimination where female firefighter applicants were
not hired after the male firefighters denied femal applicants training opportunities, ostra-
cized them, and failed to provide them with constructive criticism).
36. 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 761.
39. Id. at 754.
40. Judith J. Johnson, License to Harass Women: Requiring Hostile Environment Sexual Har-
assment to be "Severe or Pervasive" Discriminates Among "Terms and Conditions" of Employment, 62
MD. L. REv. 85, 105-06 (2003) (criticizing this new approach of "broadening" what qualifies
as hostile environment versus quid pro quo sexual harassment). Lower courts have sup-
ported this new differentiation. See, e.g., Hurley v. Atlantic City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 120
(3d Cir. 1999) (noting that Ellerth, "largely eliminated the distinction between hostile work
environment claims and quid pro quo claims, focusing instead on the presence or absence
of tangible adverse employment actions").
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III. THE FAIR HOUSING ACT
It is not surprising that, by and large, tenants have been unsuc-
cessful at bringing sexual harassment claims under the Fair
Housing Act, because the FHA was never intended to address that
problem. Instead, the FHA seeks to integrate the housing market
by eliminating discrimination, particularly racial discrimination, in
the sale or rental of properties. The overall purpose of the FHA,
the intentions underlying amendments for the addition of "pro-
tected classes," and court interpretations of § 3604 are all
consistent with the view that the FHA is concerned with how a
seller or renter must not exclude potential customers based on
their membership in a particular "group" or attempt to drive them
away from the property on that basis.
From the beginning, the FHA's purpose was to remedy the seg-
regated housing market. Though there is little legislative history
for the bill because it was a floor ameid'nent, 1 its introduction
states that "[i] t is the policy of the United States to provide, within
constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United
States."42 Additionally, referencing congressional remarks, the Su-
preme Court has noted that the FHA sought to "replace the
ghettos 'by truly integrated and balanced living patterns' 03 and to
"eliminat[e] the adverse and discriminatory effects of past and pre-
sent prejudice in housing."44 Whether the FHA has accomplished
its original goal of promoting racially integrated housing is subject
to debate.'
Racial strife in the country during the 1960s influenced and
ultimately led to passage of the FHA.46  Senator Mondale
introduced Title VIII as a floor amendment to H.R. 2516, a civil
rights workers' protection bill in February 1968. Opponents stalled
41. Resident Advisory Bd. v. Rizzo, 564 F.2d 126, 147 n.29 (3d Cir. 1977) (explaining
that the legislative history of Title VIII is limited because Senator Mondale introduced Title
VIII as a floor amendment). In fact, there are no "committee reports [or] other documents
usually accompanying congressional enactments." Id. at 147 n.29.
42. 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000).
43. Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 211 (1972) (quoting 114 CONG.
REc. 3422 (1968)).
44. Rizzo, 564 F.2d at 147 n.30 (citing 114 CONG. REc. 228, 3421 (1968)).
45. See John 0. Calmore, Race/ism Lost and Found: The Fair Housing Act at Thirty, 52 U.
MIAMI L. REv. 1067, 1071 (1998) (arguing that the Fair Housing Act has been the least ef-
fective of the civil rights laws).
46. See Wendell E. Pritchett, Where Shall We Live? Class and the Limitations of Fair Hous-
ing Law, 35 URB. LAw. 399 (2003) for a discussion of earlier attempts to attain fair housing
in the 1950s.
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the bill by continuing debate.47 Senate rules provide for unlimited
debate, which can only be ended by a vote of cloture calling for a
vote on the bill.4 8 From February until March 1, bill proponents
unsuccessfully attempted cloture votes on four occasions.4 9 The
release of the Kerner Commission's report eventually prompted
the Senate to act. The Commission noted that "[America] is
moving toward two societies, one black, one white-separate but
unequal" and noted that segregation in housing led to segregation
in schooling. 0 Furthermore, the Commission recommended that
the federal government take measures to end housing
discrimination. 5' Three days later, the fourth cloture vote passed
and the Senate finally passed the bill on March 11." From the
Senate, the bill traveled to the House for concurrence. It stalled
once it reached the House Rules Committee. 3 Once more, it took
outside events-the assassination of Martin Luther King, Jr. and
the ensuing riots in the capital-to dislodge the bill 4 The House
passed it on April 10, and President Johnson signed it on April 11,
1968.
Furthermore, when the FHA was amended in 1974 to include
"sex," the sponsor of the amendment, Senator Brock, reiterated
the view that § 3604 related to the denial of property, whether by
sale or rental, on the basis of a person's characteristics. He ac-
knowledged "the assumption that men could perform these [home
ownership] tasks while women could not is just the sort of dis-
crimination based on sex that we are talking about."5 An
amendment that prohibited denying residential property mort-
gages on the basis of sex also reflects Congress' intent to tackle
obstacles for individuals desiring to rent or purchase.56
Congress acted in a similar fashion when it amended the FHA in
1988 to prohibit discrimination against individuals with handi-
47. Id. at 151.
48. At the time, Senate Rule XXII required two-thirds of those present and voting to
invoke cloture. Today, only 60 votes are needed. Standing Rules of the Senate, S. Doc. No.
106-1, R. V, at 5 (2000).
49. Dubofsky, supra note 29, at 154-56.
50. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, Report of the National Advisory
Commission on Civil Disorders 237 (1968).
51. Id. at 229.
52. Dubofsky, supra note 29, at 158-59.
53. Id. at 160.
54. Dubofsky, supra note 29, at 160.
55. 1973 Housing and Urban Development Legislation: Hearing on S. 1064 Before the Senate
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, Subcomm. on Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d
Cong. 1228 (1973) (Statement of Sen. Brock).
56. See generally Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 683 (1974).
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caps.5 7 As the Third Circuit noted in Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Dela-
ware County, "the purpose of this statute [(section 3604(f) (1)) ] is to
protect the housing choices of handicapped individuals who seek
to buy or lease housing and of those who seek to buy or lease hous-
ing on their behalf.""8 Therefore, attempting to use the FHA to
bring a sexual harassment claim will ultimately fail because the
words "terms" and "conditions" more logically relate to aspects of
the sale or rental such as the amount of rent, the purchase price
for the sale, or mortgage terms. These terms do not relate to a sex-
ual harassment situation in which a landlord's ultimate goal is to
have the tenant remain on the premises and harasses her.
IV. How THE PROBLEM AROSE
Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the problem
of sexual harassment in housing, lower courts, beginning with the
Sixth Circuit in Shellhammer v. Lewallen,59 have applied Title VII
standards of evaluating sexual harassment in the employment con-
text to harassment cases in the housing context. Presumably, this
was done because Title VII and the FHA contain superficially simi-
lar provisions. The relevant portion of Title VII states that it is
an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect
to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of
57. Section 3604(f)(1) provides: "[tio discriminate in the sale or rental, or to other-
wise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any buyer or renter because of a handicap of-
(A) that buyer or renter,
(B) a person residing in or intending to reside in that dwelling after it is so
sold, rented, or made available; or
(C) any person associated with that buyer or renter."
42 U.S.C. § 3604(f)(1) (2000).
58. 983 F.2d 1277, 1283 (3d Cir. 1993); see also Mich. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v.
Babin, 18 F.3d 337, 344 (6th Cir. 1994) (noting that "Congress intended § 3604 to reach a
broad range of activities that have the effect of denying housing opportunities to a member
of a protected class").
59. No. 84-3573, 1985 WL 13505 (6th Cir.July 31, 1985).
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employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin,60
while the FHA makes it illegal to "discriminate against any person
in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale or rental of a dwell-
ing, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection
therewith, because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or
national origin."
6 1
Just as Title VII seeks to integrate the workforce, the F1-A seeks
to integrate the housing market. Recognizing this, courts have
viewed the statutes in tandem. As the Second Circuit has noted,
Title VII and the FHA are "part of a coordinated scheme of federal
civil rights laws enacted to end discrimination.""2 Therefore, if the
statutes are generally viewed together, it is not a stretch to analyze
sexual harassment within the two contexts in a similar fashion.
In the housing context, the importation of Title VII sexual har-
assment jurisprudence began in 1985, when the Sixth Circuit
affirmed a magistrate's finding that a sexual harassment claim was
cognizable under the FHA in Shellhammer v. Lewallen.!3 Drawing on
Title VII's hostile work environment framework, the plaintiffs,
Tammy Shellhammer and her husband, argued that the defendant
had "created an offensive environment for their tenancy" prohib-
ited under § 3604(b) of the FHA.64
Shortly after the couple moved in, Norman Lewallen asked Ms.
Shellhammer to pose nude for pictures, which she refused.65 A
month later, the landlord asked for sex, noting that he would pay
Ms. Shellhammer. In July, a dispute arose after the plaintiffs
claimed the landlords were responsible for providing a working
refrigerator.6 ' After the landlords refused to provide one, the
Shellhammers paid their rent late, and the defendants com-
menced eviction proceedings. 8 The couple eventually moved out
and filed a complaint under the FHA. In an unpublished decision,
the Sixth Circuit rejected the sexual harassment claim, finding that
"in light of the length of the ... tenancy" no hostile environment
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(b) (2000).
62. Huntington Beach NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 935 (2d Cir.
1984).







The Solution for Harassed Tenants
was created. 9 Since that time, other courts have imitated Sheliham-
met's approach by looking to Title VII for guidance when
adjudicating sexual harassment housing claims.70
Following Shellhammer, the Department of Housing and Urban
Development ("HUD"), the agency responsible for the FHA, ag-
gravated the housing sexual harassment issue by not providing any
guidance. As the Seventh Circuit has highlighted, HUD did not
address whether and under what circumstances the FHA applies to
sexual harassment.71 HUD's proposed, but never adopted, regula-
tions acknowledge that courts have "looked to Title VII ... and
associated case law and regulations for guidance '72 because the Fair
Housing Act's regulations are silent on the issue. Despite this,
HUD's proposed definitions of "quid pro quo" and "hostile envi-
ronment" claims were in line with Title VIi jurisprudence.7"
HUD's failure has not only led to continued confusion when ad-
judicating sexual harassment housing claims, but it has also meant
that courts are not bound by any legal conclusion that HUD makes
with respect to such claims. For example, in DiCenso v. Cisneros, the
Seventh Circuit rejected the HUD Secretary's determination that a
hostile environment existed because the agency had not previously
69. Id. at *3.
70. See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986) ("'[T]he phrase
'terms, conditions or privileges of employment' in [Title VII] is an expansive concept
.... )" (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972)); Cavalieri-Conway v. L. Butterman & Assocs., 992 F. Supp. 995, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1998)
("The elements of an action alleging housing discrimination parallel the elements for an
action alleging employment discrimination under Title VII."); Beliveau v. Caras, 873 F. Supp.
1393, 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995) ("[B]oth Title VII and Title VIII were 'designed to eradicate the
effects of bias and prejudice. Their purposes are, clearly, the same; only their field of opera-
tion differs."); Ginger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707 at *4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 10,
1989).
71. DiCenso v. Cisneros, 96 F.3d 1004, 1007 (7th Cir. 1996):
HUD has not even enacted guidelines regarding hostile housing environment sex
discrimination. Rather, as the HUD Secretary's Designee acknowledged, a determina-
tion of what constitutes a hostile environment in the housing context requires the
same analysis courts have undertaken in the Title VII context. Such a determination
does not require deference to an administrative agency.
Id. Ironically, HUD acknowledged the Seventh Circuit's frustration in its proposed regula-
tions. "One court has expressed concern about the Department's lack of published
standards concerning sexual harassment as a violation of the Act." Standards Governing
Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. 67,666 (Nov. 13, 2000) (to be codified at 24 C.F.R.
pt. 100).
72. Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 Fed. Reg. at 67,666.
73. Compare Standards Governing Sexual Harassment Cases, 65 FED. REG. at 67,660,
with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000).
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"considered the matter at issue in a detailed and reasoned fash-
ion."
7 4
In DiCenso, eighteen year old Christina Brown alleged that her
landlord made several advances towards her; made unauthorized
entries into the apartment she shared with her boyfriend and
daughter; and on one occasion, while caressing her arm and back,
stated that she could take care of the rent in other ways if she was
unable to pay.75 Although the administrative law judge found the
landlord responsible for the last incident, the judge did not believe
it created a hostile environment and dismissed Brown's com-
plaint. 6 HUD then sought a review, and the Secretary of HUD
reversed the administrative law judge's legal finding that that one
incident could not qualify as a hostile environment. 77 In adjudicat-
ing the landlord's appeal, the Seventh Circuit refused to defer to
HUD because it had failed to enact guidelines for sexual harass-
ment.
78
V. HOUSING VERSUS EMPLOYMENT
The extension of Title VII standards to housing is flawed for
three reasons. First, and most importantly, the policies behind Title
VII and the FHA are incompatible when applied to sexual harass-
ment problems. Second, unlike an employment relationship, the
underlying nature of the relationship between landlord and tenant
is not strictly pecuniary; therefore, the employment standards un-
der hostile environment of "severe and pervasive" and the
"reasonable person" are unworkable. Third, and finally, the biases
that pervade Title VII sexual harassment jurisprudence are ampli-
fied in the housing context.
74. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1007.
75. Id. at 1005-06 n.1.
76. Id. at 1006 n.1, 1007.
77. Id. at 1007. For a more in-depth discussion of the decision, see Carloota J. Roos,
Comment, DiCenso v. Cisneros: An Argument for Recognizing the Sanctity of the Home in Housing
Sexual Harassment Cases, 52 U. MIAMI L. Rxv. 1131 (1998) (arguing that sexual harassment in
the home should not be measured using Tide VII standards).
78. DiCenso, 96 F.3d at 1007.
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A. Sexual Harassment's Non-congruence with Title VII
and the FHA's Policies
Both Tide VII and the FHA seek to eliminate barriers to gaining
employment or entering the housing market; however, neither
adequately addresses sexual harassment in housing once the land-
lord-tenant relationship is formed. As the Court explained in
Meitor Savings Bank v. Vinson, little legislative history exists for the
provisions dealing with sex discrimination in Tide VII because
"prohibition against discrimination based on sex was added to Title
VII at the last minute on the floor of the House of Representa-
tives"79 in an effort to "kill the bill. 80 In Khan v. Shevin, the
Supreme Court acknowledged that "[w]hether from overt dis-
crimination or from the socialization process of a male-dominated
culture, the job market is inhospitable to the woman seeking any
but the lowest paid jobs" and noted there were "efforts under way
to remedy this situation ... [such as] Title VII."8' Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has characterized Title VII as a remedial measure
to "eradicate ... invidious employment practices" 82 and as a "broad
rule of workplace equality. 83 Therefore, the purpose of Title VII
was to level the playing field and open up opportunities for indi-
viduals who, because of their race, ethnicity, religion, or gender,
had been discriminated against in employment. Similarly, the
FHA's purpose was to "ensure the removal of artificial, arbitrary,
and unnecessary barriers when the barriers operate invidiously to
discriminate on the basis of impermissible characteristics."84 In this
way, neither Title VII nor the FIA addresses the problem of sexual
harassment in housing because landlords who harass do not seek
to exclude women; they prefer to have them as tenants.
79. 477 U.S. 57, 63 (1986).
80. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 767 n.1 (1998) (Thomas, J., dis-
senting) (citing Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1977)).
81. 416 U.S. 351,353 (1974).
82. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 381 (1977) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
83. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 22 (1993).
84. United States v. City of Parma, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1053 (N.D. Ohio 1980), aff'd, 661
F.2d 562 (6th Cir. 1981).
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B. Title VII's "Severe or Pervasive" and
"Reasonable Person" Standards
Instead of evaluating whether the landlord's behavior qualifies
as quid pro quo or hostile environment sexual harassment, courts
have assumed that quid pro quo harassment only exists if the
threat to evict is explicitly stated. This is most evident in the way
some courts have adopted the label of "conditioned tenancy" as a
substitute for "quid pro quo." 5 To prove a "conditioned tenancy"
exists, a tenant must demonstrate that "the landlord either
(1) conditioned any of the terms, conditions or privileges of ten-
ancy on submission to his sexual requests or (2) deprived a tenant
of any of the terms, conditions or privileges of tenancy because she
refused to accede to those requests. ''s6 In doing so, courts have in-
terpreted quid pro quo or conditioned tenancy to require eviction.
However, once a landlord propositions a tenant, the nature of the
rental agreement is changed. Instead of paying money, the land-
lord is now asking the tenant to pay with herself. The landlord
knows that the tenant is vulnerable to the terms of her housing and
is trying to take advantage of the situation. Therefore, the power
dynamic between the parties makes explicitly stating the threat
87
unnecessary.
Furthermore, courts have taken behavior that otherwise qualifies
as quid pro quo or conditioned tenancy harassment and analyzed
it under a hostile environment framework. For example, in DiCenso
85. The magistrate's opinion in Shellhammer was the first to use the term "condi-
tioned tenancy." Shellhammer v. Lewallen, Fair Hous./Fair Lend. (P-H) 15,472, 16,129 (N.D.
Ohio Nov. 22, 1983). However, in affirming the magistrate's decision that a hostile environ-
ment did not exist, the Sixth Circuit did not use the term. Shellhammer v. Lewallen, 770
E2d 167 (6th Cir. 1985). Both decisions are unpublished. Nevertheless, the Northern Dis-
trict of Illinois cited the "conditioned tenancy" language in a magistrate opinion. Grieger v.
Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *3-4 (N.D. Il. Apr. 10, 1989) (explaining the two
kinds of sexual harassment claims as "a 'conditioned tenancy' or 'quid pro quo' claim,
where the landlord either conditions any of the terms, conditions or privileges of tenancy on
submission to his sexual requests or deprives the tenant of any of those terms, conditions or
privileges because the tenant has refused to accede to his requests") (quoting Shellhammer
v. Lewallen, Fair Hous./Fair Lend. (P-H) 15,472, 16,129 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 22, 1983)).
Later, the same court again used the "conditioned tenancy" language. Cavalieri-Conway v.
Butterman, 992 F.Supp. 995, 1007 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (using the term "conditioned tenancy"
and stating that "the court's research reveals that [conditioned tenancy] applies only when a
defendant demands sexual favors in exchange for favorable treatment"); see also Beliveau v.
Caras, 873 F.Supp. 1393, 1396 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Shellhammer's term "conditioned
tenancy").
86. Grieger, 1989 WL 38707, at *3.
87. Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer, Sexual Harassment on the Second Shift: The Misfit
Application of Title VII Employment Standards to Title VIII Housing Cases, 18 LAw & INEQ. J. 351,
389 (2000).
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v. Cisneros, while rubbing the eighteen year old tenant's arm and
back, the landlord proposed that "if she could not pay the rent, she
could take care of it in other ways."88 Despite this proposal of sex in
lieu of rent, the administrative law judge used the hostile environ-
ment framework, which the Seventh Circuit affirmed. 9 Ironically,
the Seventh Circuit found that a hostile environment did not exist.
Similarly, in Brown v. Smith, the landlord told tenant Stephanie
Brown that he wanted to have sex with her and that he would not
increase the rent as planned if she would meet him "for fifteen,
twenty minutes a week" for sex.9° The Court analyzed the behavior
under a hostile environment theory.9'
Although a majority of courts have analyzed sexual harassment
claims under a theory of hostile environment,9 Title VII's "severe
or pervasive" hostile environment framework requirement is im-
practical in the housing context. In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson,
the United States Supreme Court held that for sexual harassment
to be actionable, "it must be sufficiently severe or pervasive 'to alter
the conditions of [the victim's] employment and create an abusive
working environment.' , 93 In determining whether an environment
qualifies as severe or pervasive, the Supreme Court in Harris v. Fork-
lift stated that the following factors may be considered: "whether it
is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utter-
ance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee's
work performance."94 The Court further explained that "[w]hen
the workplace is permeated with 'discriminatory intimidation, ridi-
cule, and insult' ... Title VII is violated."9' As the Court noted,
"whether an environment is 'hostile' or 'abusive' can be deter-
mined only by looking at all the circumstances.
96
88. 96 F.3d 1004, 1006 (7th Cir. 1996).
89. Id. at 1007, 1008-09.
90. Brown v. Smith, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 1997).
91. Id. at 311. Even though Brown's claim was under the California Fair Employment
and Housing Act, because the Court interpreted its meaning using the Fair Housing Act, the
claim's use is still relevant here. By contrast, in Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 490 (7th Cir.
1997), the tenant prevailed on a quid pro quo/conditioned tenancy claim; however, this is
likely because tenant Debbie Maze reported the proposal of sex for rent immediately after it
happened to an employee of the local Housing Authority and the employee continued to
stay involved in the situation by forwarding Maze's rent checks to her landlord.
92. See discussion infra Part V.B.
93. 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (quoting Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 238 (5th Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957 (1972)).
94. 510 U.S. 17, 23 (1993).
95. Id. at 21 (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65).
96. Id. at 23.
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In assessing severity and pervasiveness, courts tend to measure
the severity or seriousness of the harassment and the frequency of
the incidents. In the employment context, a woman whose boss
harasses her can expect to encounter the boss on a daily basis,
while a tenant has no way of anticipating when she will she be sub-
ject to an encounter with the landlord. Although the landlord may
have potentially unlimited access, unlike in a work environment,
the contact between tenant and landlord is less predictable and
therefore more difficult for the tenant to prepare for. Finally, "the
unequal power relationship that is inherent in harassment cases is
generally more pronounced in a landlord-tenant situation than in
an employment setting."97
Unlike job performance, which can be measured, it is much
more difficult to objectively assess how the conditions of one's ten-
ancy change. Unlike work, where a woman could take sick or
vacation days, a tenant will always need to use her home. Measur-
ing "severe or pervasive" in housing does not work because severity
and pervasiveness are ultimately reflections of how the workplace
conditions have been altered; instead, the very act of implying or
asking for sexual favors in exchange for rent instantaneously
changes the terms or conditions of the rental. In essence, the land-
lord is asking for an addendum to the lease that the tenant is no
longer in the position to "bargain" for.98 Therefore, courts should
first consider whether sexual harassment of a tenant is quid pro
quo/conditioned tenancy harassment.
Women facing workplace harassment are also more likely to
have institutional support because of the potential liability an em-
ployer faces. If a supervisor takes tangible employment action
against a subordinate after she refuses his advances, the employer
is strictly liable. If the woman reports the behavior before the su-
pervisor takes action, the employer is liable, subject to an
affirmative defense.99 The employer's two part affirmative defense
is that (1) it took "reasonable care to prevent and correct
promptly" the behavior and that (2) the employee "unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportuni-
ties provided by the employer."'00 The employer can point to the
existence of an "antiharassment policy with complaint procedure"
97. Robert G. Schwemm & Rigel C. Oliveri, A New Look at Sexual Harassment Under the
Fair Housing Act: The Forgotten Role of§ 3604(c), 2002 Wis. L. REv. 771, 786 (2002).
98. Unlike the employment context, in which harasser attempts to bribe the victim
with a promotion or other "benefit," there is nothing a housing sexual harassment victim
can receive.
99. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 753 (1998).
100. Id. at 765.
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under the first prong.' °' For this reason, employers have an incen-
tive to combat harassment or, at the very least, promote policies
and procedures for reporting harassment. Therefore, employees
are more likely to be aware of their rights and how to pursue en-
forcement of them. By contrast, a landlord acting as both owner
and day-to-day manager of a property has no similar impetus for
change.
In addition, the workplace itself can have an "institutional
memory" that can facilitate bringing a sexual harassment claim.
With a complaint procedure in place, the employer will have a re-
cord of any past complaints about a particular employee. There
will also be a greater chance of witnesses to the offensive behavior.
In the housing context, there is no complaint procedure. Fur-
thermore, because the harassment is more likely to occur within
the confines of the women's home, witnesses are less likely to exist.
For a harassed tenant living in the same building as the landlord,
this situation is even worse. 1 2 Finally, a woman who has been har-
assed is more likely to eventually move rather than to provide an
institutional memory for the building about the problem behavior.
Another problematic aspect of importing Title VII's standards is
that the measure of what qualifies as a hostile environment is
gauged from the perspective of the "reasonable person." In Harris
v. Forklift, the Supreme Court stated that to qualify as an "objec-
tively hostile or abusive work environment" under Title VII, the
"victim [must not only] subjectively perceive" the environment to
be so, but a "reasonable person" must as well. °3 How a "reasonable
person" should be defined-as a person or as a "reasonable
woman"-has been the subject of much debate.' As Deborah
Zalense points out, the "as a person" standard reflects middle-class
white male views, while using the "reasonable woman" standard
results in the false assumption that there is an "essential" woman.105
101. Id.
102. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
103. Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993).
104. See Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of Reasonable-
ness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1214-33 (1990) (evaluating arguments for a
reasonable woman standard); William Litt, et al., Recent Development: Sexual Harassment Hits
Home, 2 UCLA WOMEN's L.J. 227, 241 (1992) (arguing that "Title VIII litigation would bene-
fit if courts applied the 'reasonable woman' standard"). But see Ellen Frankel Paul, Sexual
Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 333, 362 n.116
(1990) (arguing against adopting the "reasonable woman" standard as making sexual har-
assment claims by men more difficult).
105. Deborah Zalense, The Intersection of Socioeconomic Class and Gender in Hostile Housing
Environment Claims under Title WIL Who is the Reasonable Person?, 38 B.C. L. REv. 861, 864
(1997).
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Therefore, transporting either standard into the housing context is
particularly problematic because a disproportionate number of
renters affected by sexual harassment are poor women of color.""6
Courts' assumption that housing sexual harassment claims should
be analyzed under the hostile environment framework rather than
first considering whether a quid pro quo/conditioned tenancy exists
is misguided because it ignores the power landlords wield over ten-
ants. Moreover, even if a claim is more appropriately categorized as a
hostile environment claim, Tide VII's measurement of what qualifies
as a "severe or pervasive" hostile environment according to the "rea-
sonable person" is ill-suited for the housing context. It too ignores
the power dynamic between the parties and the reason the relation-
ship was formed in the first place.
Instead, as the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts pro-
posed in Gnerre v. Massachusetts Commission Against Discrimination,
housing sexual harassment claims should be evaluated according
to "whether the landlord's actions have rendered a tenancy less
desirable." °7 In Gnerre, the Court found that landlord Antonio
Gnerre's sexual harassment of single mother Barbara Silverstein
interfered with her ability to fully "use and to enjoy the leased
premises."1 8 The Court pointed to the fact that Silverstein "became
reluctant to have Gnerre enter her apartment to make repairs,"
"did not use fully the facilities of her apartment," such as her back
porch and the laundry because she feared encountering Gnerre,
and stayed inside or did not return home right away if she saw
Gnerre's truck parked in the driveway.' 9 Silverstein also did not
invite guests over because she feared Gnerre would make sexual
comments to her in their presence.11
C. Title VII's Biases Amplified
In an effort to address plaintiffs' failure to meet Title VII's "se-
vere or pervasive" requirement, commentators, beginning with
Regina Cahan, have argued that landlord-tenant harassment is
more traumatic because it occurs in the victim's home."' Unlike
the workplace, the tenant has no escape if the landlord harasses
106. Id.
107. 524 N.E.2d 84, 88 (Mass. 1988).
108. Id. at 89.
109. Id. at 89-90.
110. Id. at 90.
111. See, e.g., Cahan, supra note 10, at 1073; Lindemyer, supra note 87.
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her, as the harassment constitutes a "complete invasion in her
life..... However, proposing that courts recognize harassment at
home as more egregious than the workplace does not ultimately
benefit harassed tenants. Instead, it has the potential to perpetuate
already existing biases within sexual harassment jurisprudence.
First, emphasizing the "context" of the home could backfire be-
cause it invites courts to consider the victim's economic class.
Second, it ignores the special place of "home" in the law in gen-
eral. Therefore, courts should first focus on the nature of the
relationship between the parties and why it exists rather than the
setting in which the harassment occurs.
In extending Tide VII to cover same sex sexual harassment in
Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services Inc., the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the "inquiry requires careful consideration of the
social context in which particular behavior occurs and is experi-
enced by its target."13 As an example, the Court cited how a
football coach smacking a player on the behind is different than
the coach acting the same way toward a secretary."' As Justice
Scalia remarked, the "real social impact of workplace behavior of-
ten depends on a constellation of surrounding circumstances,
expectations, and relationships which are not fully captured by a
simple recitation of the words used or the physical acts per-
formed."' 5
If read literally, Oncale bolsters the arguments of Cahan and oth-
ers by treating the harassment as more egregious because of the
setting-the home versus the workplace. However, there is a
greater danger that emphasizing context invites courts to impose a
different standard for tenants based on class, as this has often been
true in employment cases." 6 For example, when assessing a hostile
work environment, courts have tended to impose a higher burden
of proof on women who work in blue-collar positions as compared
to those in the white-collar world."7 Accordingly, it would be no
surprise that women from a low socio-economic class have their
housing sexual harassment claims largely ignored by the courts.
112. Cahan, supra note 10, at 1073.
113. 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 82.
116. See Rebecca Brannan, Note, When the Pig is in the Barnyard, Not the Parlor: Should
Courts Apply a "Coarseness Factor" in Analyzing Blue-Collar Hostile Work Environment Claims., 17
GA. ST. U. L. REv. 789 (2001), for a discussion of how courts treat hostile work environment
claims by blue collar women.
117. Id. at823-24.
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In support for the argument that harassment at home should be
considered more offensive, some commentators have emphasized
the separate sphere the home has occupied in other areas of the
law.118 For example, Nicole A. Forkenbrock Lindemyer cites the
law's different treatment of self defense as it relates to an intruder,
the protected sphere under Fourth Amendment search and sei-
• 120
zure laws in the home,1 9 and picketing outside one's residence.
Additionally, in objecting to the FHA, Senator Sparkman sup-
ported the right to control one's property by stating that "attempts
to dictate the conditions under which a person can sell or rent his
own property... accomplish[] very little other than a deprivation
of important property rights in the conventional field to which
every landowner is entitled.' 2 1 Therefore, the argument stressing
that sexual harassment at home is more egregious because of the
special place the home holds in the law may lead courts to instead
weigh the landlord's property ownership more heavily than the
tenant's rights.
Similarly, Beverly Balos argues that this notion of "home" and its
privacy implications cause tenants to lose sexual harassment
claims. 22 In her opinion, courts side with the party possessing more
economic power. 1 They favor the landlord's privacy in conducting
his business operations over the tenant's privacy rights in feeling
safe and secure in her home. 24 Courts are ultimately reluctant to
invade the privacy of the home to stop this form of intimate vio-
lence, just as they turned a blind eye to domestic violence cases in
the mid-nineteenth century.
2 5
Arguing that sexual harassment in the home is more egregious
than in the workplace because of where it takes place is undoubt-
edly true, but doing so invokes comparisons to Title VII's
framework for sexual harassment claims. Instead, sexual harass-
118. See, e.g., Zalesne, supra note 105, 886-88; Lindemyer, supra note 87, at 369.
119. Lindemyer, supra note 87, at 369 n.89 (citing Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 603
(1980)("[Wlarrantiess arrests in one's home violate the Fourth Amendment, even though
the same warrantless arrest in public may be permissible, because the sanctity of the home
confers special protection.")).
120. Id. at 369 (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 488 (1988) (upholding an
"[olrdinance that prohibited picketing outside one's home in light of First Amendment
challenge.")).
121. David A. Thomas, Fixing Up Fair Housing Laws: Are We Ready for Reform?, 53 S.C. L.
REv. 7, 13 (2001) (quoting 114 CONG. REc. 920 (1968)).
122. Balos, supra note 2.
123. Id. at 92-93.
124. Id. at 98.
125. Id. at 88. Other commentators have discussed how "the concept of 'home' ... re-
flect[s] the relationship between women and their role in society." Adams, supra note 1, at
20.
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ment in the home needs its own standard because the situations
are so factually dissimilar,1 2 6 the purposes behind Title VII and FHA
are not congruent, and the biases and prejudices present in Title
VII are transported and amplified in the housing context.
VI. MOVING AWAY FROM TITLE VII: ALTERNATIVE USES
FOR THE FHA
In recognition of the FHA's failure to provide relief to sexually
harassed tenants, Professor Robert G. Schwemm and Department
of Justice attorney Rigel C. Oliveri instead propose that sexual har-
assment claims be brought under those sections of the FHA,
namely § 3604(c), that differ from Title VII. 127 Although their solu-
tion may work for some tenants, the FHA is ultimately an
inadequate remedy because, as discussed earlier, its underlying pol-
icy is ill-suited to address the problem of sexual harassment and
because the FHA excludes those tenants who are most vulner-
able
A. Using § 3604(c)
Schwemm and Oliveri argue that the FHA offers broader protec-
tion to plaintiffs who cannot meet the "severe or pervasive"
126. Similarly, courts have recognized that applying Title VII sexual harassment em-
ployment standards to the education context under Title IX is not ideal. E.g., Bruneau v. S.
Kortright Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp. 162, 170 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (rejecting plaintiffs argu-
ment for wholesale importation of Title VI's "hostile work environment" as the basis for a
"hostile learning environment" and instead observing that "a Court must determine the
appropriate segments and the proper extent to which the law of Title VII applies to a given
Title IX analysis. Title VII jurisprudence is a guide, and a Court should not blindly apply
Title VII to determine the issues raised in a Title IX case").
127. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 97, at 790-91.
128. Alternatively, others have suggested using § 3617 of the FHA to bring sexual har-
assment claims. Section § 3617 makes it:
unlawful to coerce, intimidate, threaten, or interfere with any person in the exercise
or enjoyment of, or on account of his having exercised or enjoyed, or on account of
his having aided or encouraged any other person in the exercise or enjoyment of, any
right granted or protected by sections 3603, 3604, 3605 or 3606.
42 U.S.C § 3617 (2000). See Robert Rosenthal, Note, Landlord Sexual Harassment: A Federal
Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. REv. 589, 597 (1992) (describing the Fair Housing Act as "the most
promising avenue" for sexual harassment claims).
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requirement of employment based sexual harassment 29 or because
the "defendant's behavior was not egregious enough to warrant a
'terms and conditions' violation." 30 Therefore, claims should move
away from subsection (b) of the FRA, which has "terms and condi-
tions" language similar to Title VII, to subsection (c), which is
entirely different from Title VII.
Section 3604(c) states that it is unlawful "[t]o make, print, or
publish, or cause to be made, printed, or published any notice,
statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a
dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimina-
tion based on ... sex ... or an intention to make any such
preference, limitation, or discrimination."' Schwemm and Oliveri
single out the words "statement ... with respect to the ... rental
... that indicates ... discrimination" to argue that verbal harass-
ment fits under subsection (c). However, given that the word
"statement" is placed between "notice" and "advertisement," it is
more likely this reflects the legislative intent to not only restrict
official, public, and permanently visible announcements express-
ing an intent to only sell or rent to a certain kind of person, but
also to attack the more subtle kinds of bias a seller or renter might
have. Furthermore, Schwemm and Oliveri argue that "rental" cov-
ers not only the negotiation for the rental, but also the ongoing
enjoyment of the premises after the signing of the lease because
the most popular dictionary at the time when the FHA was enacted
defined "rental" in this way. 3 2 Yet, given that the next clause is
"with respect to sale or rental," this particular section seems to be
speaking to what is inappropriate behavior concerning the rental
or sale, not to the aftereffects of a purchase or the enjoyment of it.
In this way, subsection (c) concerns a potential seller or renter who
does not want to sell or rent to a certain "kind" of person.
Schwemm and Oliveri acknowledge that § 3604(c)'s purpose was
not to address sexually harassing statements, yet they contend that
as remedial legislation, the FHA can, and should, be read broadly
to prohibit them. 3  In doing so, they cite Oncale v. Sundower Offshure
Serv. Incorp. for support.'34 In Oncale, the Supreme Court extended
129. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 97 at 783, 786.
130. Id. at 773.
131. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
132. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 97, at 799.
133. Id. at 799 n.140 (citing City of Edmonds v. Oxford House, Inc., 514 U.S. 725, 731
(1995); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 380 (1982); Trafficante v. Metro. Life
Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972)).
134. 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
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Title VII's prohibition of sexual harassment to include male-on-
male sexual harassment. However, Oncale's extension of Title VII is
distinguishable from the way in which Schwemm and Oliveri at-
tempt to extend protection of the FHA to sexually harassed
tenants.
Even if remedial legislation should be interpreted broadly, it
must still be read consistently with its underlying purpose. Al-
though sexual harassment protection under Title VII had not
previously been afforded in cases where the harasser was of the
same sex, its extension in Oncale was still consistent with the under-
lying policy of Title VII: to prevent workplace discrimination and
exclusion based on an individual's membership in a particular
group. By contrast, the rationale of trying to prevent exclusion of
certain individuals as property owners or renters is different in
sexual harassment cases because landlords not only want to keep
tenants; some may deliberately solicit female tenants and those of
low economic means. For example, in May of 2004, a Kansas jury
assessed $1.1 million in damages against a landlord who sexually
harassed eleven of his young, female tenants over the period of a
decade. 3 5 In one particularly egregious situation, defendant Bobby
Veal forced a tenant to have sex with him in front of her young
children.'36 All of the women renting from Veal received federal
housing assistance."' The DOJ has brought several other claims
against landlords accused of repeatedly harassing their female ten-
ants. 
3 8
[M]ale-on-male sexual harassment in the workplace was assuredly not the principal
evil Congress was concerned with when it enacted Title VII. But statutory prohibi-
tions often go beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns of our legisla-
tors by which we are governed.
Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 97, at 810 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 79). Given Justice
Scalia's plain meaning approach, it is more likely that in Oncale he was searching for a way to
provide coverage for an egregious example of rape of one man by another than he was seek-
ing to broaden the scope of Title VII. For a discussion of how Oncale may affect (and hurt)
future claimants as well as how the decision ignores harassment of gays and lesbians in gen-
eral, see David D. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation Problem in Sexual
Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REv. 1697 (2002).
135. Mark Morris, Tenants Win $1.1 Million in Sex Case; Landlord Preyed on Vulnerable
Women, KAN. CITY STAR, May 14, 2004, at 1, available at 2004 WL 78445856.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Landlord Pays $100,000 to Settle Justice Department Housing Bias, Sexual
Discrimination Lawsuit, STATES NEWS SERV., Apr. 19, 2004, at A4 available at 2004 WL
76674824 (settling a sexual harassment suit by thirteen tenants, landlord agrees to pay them
$92,500 as well as a civil penalty of $7,500 to the federal government); Come-Ons to Tenants
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B. FHA Exclusions
Even if the FHA could be read to include sexual harassment, its
coverage explicitly exempts situations in which tenants are most
vulnerable. Like Title VII, which does not cover businesses employ-
ing fewer than fifteen people,5 9 the FHA contains the notorious
"Mrs. Murphy exception "140 to exclude a landlord who lives in the
same building with the tenants. This section, 3603(b) (2), exempts
"rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied or
intended to be occupied by no more than four families living in-
dependently of each other, if the owner actually maintains and
occupies one of such living quarters as his residence"141 Hence, the
exceptions to FHA's coverage aggravate the situation in which the
landlord is ever present.
Similarly, small scale renters are also not covered. Section
3603(b) (1) excludes a "single-family house ... rented by an
owner" who does not own "more than three such single-family
houses at any one time."42 In this way, a harassed tenant who is the
only person occupying the premises is more vulnerable because it
is unlikely there will be witnesses to the offensive behavior. How-
ever, the FHA does include the small owner who uses professional
real estate services or facilities or who violates § 3604(c), which
prohibits statements or advertisements indicating a preference, or
an intent to prefer, based on race, color, religion, sex, handicap,
familial status, or national origin."'
It is admirable to seek a new solution in the FHA, but the Fair
Housing Act does not address the severity of the problem of sexual
harassment. Schwemm and Oliveri resort to subsection (c) because
tenants have failed in their attempts to have harassment fit under
subsection (b), which echoes the sentiment of Title VII. Instead,
they propose that § 3604(c) "is applicable in virtually every sexual
harassment case."'" However, § 3604(c) is not likely to offer addi-
Cost Landlord $451,000, 24 NAT'L LJ. 40 (2004), at B3 (finding landlord liable to twenty-two
female tenants in the amount of $451,000 for sexual harassment based on sexual remarks
and sexual demands in exchange for better conditions or in lieu of rent).
139. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (2000).
140. Conservatives created the fictional widow, "Mrs. Murphy," who owned a boarding
house and did not wish to rent to African Americans. Although the exception became part
of the FHA, it was originally introduced as part of the public accommodation act of Tide II.
For a more in depth discussion, see James D. Walsh, Reaching Mrs. Murphy: A Callfor Repeal of
the Mrs. Murphy Exemption to the Fair Housing Act, 34 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 605 (1999).
141. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b)(2) (2000).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 3603(b) (1) (2000).
143. 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000).
144. Schwemm & Oliveri, supra note 97, at 774.
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tional assistance to harassed tenants because the plain meaning of
the text needs to be stretched to cover sexual harassment, making
it unlikely a court will grant a plaintiff relief. More importantly,
§ 3604(c) is concerned with preventing exclusion, not the exertion
of power in an already existing relationship. The subsection fo-
cuses on the words themselves as a harm rather than how the
words change the nature of the rental relationship itself.
VII. NEED FOR A NEW REMEDY
Sexual harassment harms both the individual tenant and society
as a whole; therefore, in devising a remedy, policymakers need to
address both concerns. The woman who has been harassed should
be put back, as much as possible, in the position she would have
been but for the harassment. This should include a provision of
safe housing as well as compensation for the costs of moving and
searching for alternative housing. The harasser should also be pe-
nalized so the harassment does not recur. The remedy must take
account of how the relationship between landlord and tenant is
framed and address the fact that the woman both suffered sexual
harassment and paid for safe housing that she did not receive.
Although tort law might allow poor women to bring a case if
they are accepted on a contingency fee basis, it does not necessarily
follow that the defendant has the economic means to pay the dam-
age award. The landlord may not necessarily be of a much higher
economic class than the tenant, and the tenant may receive noth-
ing, even after a long trial. 14 In this way, the tort remedy is more
theoretical than practical as it ultimately fails to provide relief to
tenants. This in turn could make attorneys less willing to take the
case. 146 Therefore, tort options, such as intentional infliction of
145. In Brown v. Smith, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 306 (Ct. App. 1997), the Court noted that
only a partial transcript was available from below because neither party could afford the
$420 a day for a court reporter.
146. In several instances, district courts have granted summary judgment for insurance
companies on the grounds that the landlord's insurance did not cover acts of sexual har-
assment. See, e.g., American Nat'l Gen. Ins. Co. v. Jackson, 203 F. Supp. 2d 674 (S.D. Miss.
2001) (granting insurance company's motion for declaratory judgment that it did not have
to provide legal representation for a landlord accused of sexual harassing numerous women
because the acts were intentional harms and therefore, not covered under the rental
owner's policy); Armed Forces Ins. Exch. v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 966 P.2d 1099 (Haw. Ct.
App. 1998).
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emotional distress, should be additional routes to recovery rather
than the sole means.
1 4 7
The tenant needs a remedy that is immediate, does not require
going to court, and allows her to regain some of her lost sense of
power or control. Two property doctrines may give rise to such a
remedy: the covenant of quiet enjoyment and the implied warranty
of habitability. Given the disruption the landlord causes to the ten-
ant's life, claiming breach of quiet enjoyment might seem a more
obvious choice. However, quiet enjoyment's historical roots in con-
veyance limit its usefulness within the harassment context: to
succeed on an action for a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoy-
ment, a tenant must vacate the premises.
The implied warranty of habitability does not suffer from quiet
enjoyment's conveyance-based handicaps. Born of contract, the
implied warranty of habitability allows the tenant to withhold rent
and remain on the premises. Therefore, in the proceeding sec-
tions, this Article proposes broadening the implied warranty of
habitability to include cases of sexual harassment-termed here
the "implied warranty of freedom from sexual harassment"
("IWFSH").
A. Quiet Enjoyment
Pursuing a breach of quiet enjoyment claim is a risky and unre-
alistic option for tenants. 48 Although the Restatement (Second) of
Property states that a tenant does not have to vacate in order to
claim breach,'49 in sexual harassment claims brought on a theory of
quiet enjoyment, courts have regarded the tenant's abandonment
as an indication of both her credibility as well as the severity of the
harassment. For example, in Beliveau v. Caras, the court dismissed
the plaintiffs breach of quiet enjoyment claim because she still re-
sided on the premises.150 Linda Beliveau alleged that in the process
147. Moving away from the FHA towards property and tort law options is also consistent
with criticism of Title VII's failure to address the personal nature of the harm that sexual
harassment victims face in the employment context. See Paul, supra note 104; Joanna Strom-
berg, Sexual Harassment: Discrimination or Tort, 12 U.C.L.A. WOMEN'S L.J. 317 (2003).
148. In order to avoid the risk of moving out and then losing on a breach of quiet en-
joyment claim, a commercial tenant brought a declaratory judgment asking if the conditions
qualified as breach before moving out. See Charles E. Burt, Inc. v. Seven Grand Corp., 163
N.E.2d 4 (Mass. 1959). This is unrealistic for a residential tenant, especially one with little
economic resources.
149. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD & TENANT § 6.1 cmt. h (1977).
150. 873 F. Supp. 1393, 1395 (C.D. Cal. 1995).
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of fixing her leaky shower, the building manager put his arm
around her while commenting on her attractiveness and noting
that "he would like to keep her company anytime."' 5' After Ms. Be-
liveau pushed him away, he "grabbed her breast, and, after being
pushed away again, grabbed her buttock as she walked away from
him."' 52 In Honce v. Vigil, the Tenth Circuit stated that abandon-
ment is not required to claim breach of quiet enjoyment, yet it
failed to find the landlord's behavior as sufficiently hostile, describ-
ing it instead as "erratic." '153
The Court ignored the landlord's three solicitations for dates
post-lease signing because Ms. Honce still moved in, and, after her
refusals, the landlord did nothing to prevent her from moving in.1
54
Recognizing the economic realties of the situation, Judge Seymour
dissented:
The majority seemingly believes that a single mother of a
young child who has just borrowed money to buy a mobile
home and has signed a rental agreement for the lot onto
which she has moved it somehow is completely free to aban-
don the lease and leave the premises upon finding the
conduct of her new landlord offensive.
By contrast, the Seventh Circuit emphasized that Debbie Maze, a
single mother with two children, eventually moved out of her Sec-
tion 8 housing to live with her mother to avoid the landlord after
he constantly solicited sex from her. 156 It found for Ms. Maze in her
sexual harassment claim under the FHA.
For the reasons explained above, requiring that a tenant move
out, force the landlord to evict her, or initiate proceedings in
courts are unrealistic and unfair demands from the harassed ten-
ant's point of view. 57 The proposed remedy means nothing if the
151. Id.
152. Id. Ironically, the court found for Ms. Beliveau on her Fair Housing claim.
153. 1 E3d 1085 (10th Cir. 1993).
154. Id. at 1091.
155. Id. at 1093.
156. Krueger v. Cuomo, 115 F.3d 487, 491 (7th Cir. 1997) (recounting the administra-
tive law judge's finding of breach of quiet enjoyment where landlord's sexual harassment of
tenant forced her to vacate the premises).
157. But see Deborah Dubroff, Sexual Harassment, Fair Housing and Remedies: Expanding
Statutory Remedies Into a Common Law Framework, 19 T. JEFFERSON L. REv. 215, 235 (1997)
(arguing that a landlord's sexual harassment of a tenant be viewed as a breach of a quiet
enjoyment with the possibility that there be an exception to the move out requirement).
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only way to enforce it is through court proceedings. Instead, as this
Article will show, the only practical solution is rent abatement.'
B. Breach of IWH
Sexual harassment of a tenant constitutes an unsafe condition of
the leased premises and therefore should be considered a breach
of the implied warranty of habitability ("IWH"). 1"' Under the im-
plied warranty of habitability, the landlord is responsible for
delivering and maintaining premises that are safe and habitable for
the tenant.60 The implied warranty of habitability is the center-
piece of the agreement between landlord and tenant. A breach
occurs when the defect is not simply inconvenient or unattractive,
but "of such a substantial nature as to render the premises unsafe
or unsanitary, and thus unfit for occupancy."6' In effect, "[t]he
condition complained of must be such as to truly render the prem-
ises uninhabitable in the eyes of a reasonable person." 62 In
situations where the landlord has breached, the tenant may either
stop paying rent or reduce payments by the amount of the defect-
the "difference in value" or the "percentage reduction in use"-
subtracting the value of the apartment with the defect from the
rental cost.
163
Holding the landlord's sexual harassment of a tenant to be a
breach of the IWH is consistent with the policy behind the original
imposition of the IWH on leases as well as with the expectations of
158. Edward Chase & E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., Landlord and Tenant: A Study in Property and
Contract, 30 VILL. L. REv. 571, 645 n.246, (1985), ("It does the tenant no good to be told that
he has a substantive right to habitable premises if the only way he can enforce that right is by
costly proceedings in a higher court. The ideal remedy from the tenant's point of view,
granted the substantive right, is a self-help remedy ... .") (citing Charles Donahue, Jr.,
Change in the American Law of Landlord and Tenant, 37 MOD. L. REv. 242, 245 (1974))).
159. Plaintiffs in employment and education settings have argued that the sexual har-
assment they faced created an unsafe environment; however, in these instances, the courts
did not address the issue because they were considering summary judgment motions. See
Kelley v. Worley, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1313 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (deciding defendant's motion
for summary judgment, "assum[ing] without deciding" that sexual harassment qualifies as
an unsafe work condition, while noting the novelty of the theory); Bruneau v. S. Kortright
Cent. Sch. Dist., 935 F. Supp 162, 176 (N.D.N.Y. 1996) (dismissing the defendant's motion
for summary judgment regarding whether peer behavior at school qualified as sexual har-
assment and made a sixth grader feel "unsafe").
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY § 5.5 (1) (1977).
161. Glascoe v. Trinkle, 479 N.E. 2d 915, 920 (Ill. 1985).
162. Id.
163. Cazares v. Ortiz, 168 Cal. Rptr. 108, 113 (App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1980); Glascoe, 479
N.E.2d at 921.
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the tenant when signing the rental agreement. Furthermore, it is a
logical extension of the courts' move away from defining "safe" in
terms of the property's structural aspects to include landlord liabil-
ity for the foreseeable criminal behavior of third parties as well as
the presence of lead paint. Accordingly, if a landlord is liable for
the criminal behavior of third parties over whom he has little or no
control, it is logical that he should be accountable for his own be-
havior, which is completely under his control.
164
1. Background: Policy Behind IWH-Recognizing that the nature
of the lease has changed over time and that there is a power imbal-
ance between landlord and tenant, courts have imposed an
implied warranty of habitability on residential leases. 165 When im-
posing the IWH, courts have noted that the conception of the lease
was outdated. Historically, leases concerned the conveyances of
real property premised on a business relationship between land-
owners and farmers. 66 Accordingly, the "value of the lease to the
tenant [was] the land itself."1 67 Today, the landlord still generates a
profit through rentals, but the importance of a residential lease for
the tenant is to obtain a habitable dwelling.6 It is "more than mere
delivery of possession and the fixing of rent."1 69 As the D.C. District
Court explained injavins v. First National Realty,
When American city dwellers, both rich and poor, seek "shel-
ter" today, they seek a well known package of goods and
services [,] a package which includes not merely walls and ceil-
ings, but also adequate heat, light and ventilation, serviceable
164. While some leases have exculpatory clauses limiting the landlord's liability for in-
jury to the tenant, a discussion about their impact is beyond the scope of this Article. For an
examination of exculpatory provisions in residential leases as violative of public policy, see
Karen A. Read, Public Policy Violations or Permitted Provisions?: The Validity of Exculpatory Provi-
sions in ResidentialLeases, 62 Mo. L. REv. 897 (1997).
165. Unlike residential leases, a warranty of habitability is not implied in commercial
leases according to the law of most states. See, e.g., B.W.S. Invs. v. Mid-Am Rests., Inc., 459
N.W.2d 759 (N.D. 1990); Hong v. Estate of Graham, 70 P.3d 647 (Haw. 2003);J.B. Stein &
Co. v. Sandberg, 419 N.E.2d 652 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981)(finding that the implied warranty of
habitability does not extend to commercial leases); Russell-Stanley Corp. v. Plant Indus.,
Inc., 595 A.2d 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991). However, one Texas court of appeals has
imposed the implied warranty of habitability on commercial leases. Parts Indus. Corp. v.
A.V.A. Servs., Inc., 104 S.W.3d 671 (Tex. App. 2003).
166. Javins v. First Nat'l Realty, 428 E2d 1071, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
167. Id.
168. Kline v. Burns, 276 A.2d 248 (N.H. 1971).
169. King v. Moorehead, 495 S.W.2d 65, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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plumbing facilities, secure windows and doors, proper sanita-
tion, and proper maintenance.170
Furthermore, the unequal bargaining power between the parties
mandated a better remedy. Although legislatures provided tenants
with some protection through housing codes,' as the New York
Court of Appeals observed, "until development of the [implied]
warranty of habitability in residential leases, the contemporary ten-
ant possessed few private remedies and little real power, under
either the common law or modern housing codes, to compel his
landlord to make necessary repairs or provide essential services.
171
Therefore, consistent with the expectations of the parties, courts
have reasoned that the common law basis for regarding a lease as a
conveyance is outdated.7 3 Instead, a lease should be interpreted
more in line with contract principles in order to "reflect contem-
porary community values and ethics."
7 4
2. "Safe" Under Criminal Acts and Lead Paint-Recognizing a
landlord's sexual harassment of a tenant as a breach of the implied
warranty of habitability is consistent with the LWH's policy that the
landlord provide a "safe" living environment, including protection
from the criminal acts of third parties and the absence of lead
paint.
Under negligence theory, courts have imposed liability on land-
lords who failed to protect tenants from the criminal acts of third
parties where the landlord had control over the premises or where
the landlord created the danger that led to the tenant's injury. In
Kline v. 1500 Massachusetts Avenue Apartments Corp., the D.C. Circuit
Court first imposed liability upon a landlord for the criminal acts
of a third party after Sarah Kline was robbed and criminally as-
saulted in the common hallway of the 585-unit apartment
building.17 Although conceding that the "landlord is no insurer of
170. Javins, 428 F.2d at 1074. When imposing the IWr into leases, other states have
cited Javins's language. E.g., King 495 S.W.2d at 70 (imposing the PAWH on Missouri leases);
Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526 (NJ. 1990) (imposing the PWH on New Jersey residential
leases).
171. Reste Realty Corp. v. Cooper, 251 A.2d 268, 272 (N.J. 1969) (noting that "an
awareness by legislatures of the inequality of bargaining power between landlord and tenant
in many cases, and the need for tenant protection, has produced remedial tenement house
and multiple dwelling statutes").
172. Park West Mgmt. Corp. v. Mitchell, 391 N.E.2d 1288, 1292 (N.Y. 1979).
173. Javins, 428 E2d at 1074-75.
174. Id. (quoting Whetzel v. Jess Fisher Mgmt. Co., 282 F.2d 943, 946 (D.C. Cir. 1960)).
175. 439 F2d 477 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (MacKinnon, J. dissenting). As BA. Glesner notes,
Sarah Kline "was not the first to advance the common premises theory as the basis of a land-
lord's liability for criminal activities, only the first to succeed." BA Glesner, Landlords as
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his tenants' safety,"176 the court found the defendant liable because
criminal activity was "entirely predictable."1" Tenants, including
Kline, had notified the landlord of previous, similar criminal at-
tacks on tenants, yet the landlord did nothing.18 Furthermore, the
landlord, having exclusive control over the common areas, was the
only one in a position to change security measures, 179 while the
tenants' ability to "provide for [their] own protection ha[d] been
limited in some way by [their] submission to the control of the"
landlord.8 0 Therefore, the court found that the leases implied the
duty to "provide those protective measures which are within [the
landlord's] reasonable capacity"'8' so as to "minimize the risk to his
tenants. ,182
Courts have also imposed liability where the landlord creates the
danger or places the tenants at greater risk than they would nor-
mally face. In Kendall v. Gore Properties, Inc., the D.C. Circuit Court
found a landlord could be held liable for his failure to perform a
background check on a worker who later strangled a tenant while
painting her apartment.' Although recognizing that a landlord is
not the "guarantor of the safety of his tenant," the Court acknowl-
edged that the landlord had a duty "not to create an unsafe
condition in the premises either permanent or temporary by any
affirmative action on his part.",
8 4
Similarly, the Supreme Court of Missouri found that a landlord
could be held liable after an intruder used the fire escape to enter
the third floor apartment of a tenant and sexually assault her.
8 5
The tenant had previously explained to the landlord that the latch
on her window was broken and that she feared for her safety.186 The
Court emphasized that the landlord was the only one with control
over the fire escape and that such a risk was foreseeable. 87 The
landlord was therefore guilty of "active negligence" by creating a
risk "which would not otherwise have existed by causing the fire
Cops: Tort, Nuisance & Forfeiture Standards Imposing Liability on Landlords for Crime on the Prem-
ises, 42 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 679, 689 n.36 (1992).
176. Kline, 439 F.2d at 481.
177. Id. at 480.
178. Id. at 479.
179. Id. at 480, 482.
180. Id. at 483.
181. Id. at 485.
182. Id. at 484.
183. 236 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
184. Id. at 680 (quoting Bailey v. Zlotnick, 149 F.2d 505, 506 (D.C. Cir. 1945)).
185. Aaron v. Havens, 758 S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1988).
186. Id. at 447.
187. Id. at 448.
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escape to be constructed in such a way to make the tenant more
vulnerable to attack from a person unlawfully entering the apart-
ment than she would have been otherwise."'88
Likewise, in Stubbs v. Panek, the Missouri Court of Appeals re-
versed a lower court's grant of summary judgment to a landlord
who refused to repair a defective door lock or to allow the tenant
to do so.' 9 The defect allowed an intruder to enter, abduct the ten-
ant's child, and eventually assault and murder the child.1 90 In
finding for the tenant, the Court stressed the tenant's "obvious
special vulnerability ... combined with the landlord's obstinate
refusal to allow the tenant to repair the lock."' 9
Unlike the neighborhood or other external factors not within
the landlord's direct control, the landlord's behavior towards the
tenant is completely within his control. Some commentators have
described a landlord's sexual harassment as a criminal act similar
to solicitation for prostitution or extortion."" Therefore, if the
landlord is obligated to protect tenants from the criminal acts of
third parties in the building as an extension of his duty to provide
safe premises,' 94 it is logical to extend this duty to behavior that is
entirely under his control and sufficiently analogous to a criminal
act. Furthermore, as the courts in Kline and Stubbs recognized, a
tenant surrenders some loss of control over the premises by signing
the lease. In sexually harassing a tenant, a landlord abuses this loss
of control.
Additionally, by sexually harassing a tenant, a landlord creates
danger. Even in cases that reject negligence claims against land-
lords because the harm was not foreseeable, some courts still
recognize liability for danger the landlord creates. For example, in
Kopoian v. George W Miller & Co., the Missouri Court of Appeals
denied a tenant's argument that the landlord's negligence in fail-
ing to provide adequate lighting, to trim overgrown bushes near
the front entrance, and to provide a deadbolt lock caused a robber
188. Kopoian v. George W. Miller & Co., 901 S.W.2d 63, 69 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) (Ken-
nedyJ., dissenting).
189. 829 S.W.2d 544 (Mo. Ct. App. 1992).
190. Id. at 546.
191. Kopoian, 901 S.W.2d at 70 (explaining the court's holding in Stubbs).
192. Adams, supra note 1, at 60.
193. See generally Carrie N. Baker, Sexual Extortion: Criminalizing Quid Pro Quo Sexual Har-
assment, 13 LAw & INEQ. 213 (1994) (arguing that quid pro quo sexual harassment is a form
of extortion).
194. It should be noted, however, that in both New Hampshire and Virginia, landlords
were not held liable for attacks strangers perpetrated on female tenants or guests in com-
plex parking lots. Deem v. Charles E. Smith Mgmt., Inc., 799 F.2d 944 (4th Cir. 1986); Walls
v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103 (N.H. 1993).
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to assault him. 95 Instead, the Court reasoned that the attack was
not foreseeable. 196 Still, the Court noted that a duty may exist
"when the misfeasance of the landlord creates a circumstance of
extraordinary danger or enhances the risk of the tenant's victimiza-
tion beyond the risk of crime victimization generally."1 97 Similarly,
in Cooke v. Allstate Management Corp., the tenant claimed negligence
against the landlord for leaving a ladder near her apartment that
an intruder used to climb into her balcony and stab her several
times in an attempt to rape her.9" Ultimately, a landlord who sexu-
ally harasses a tenant does more than enhance the risk to the
tenant: he causes immediate harm.
Although courts have imposed a duty on the landlord to provide
safe premises under negligence theories, a tenant could, building
on a New Jersey Supreme Court decision, argue that a failure to
protect from foreseeable criminal acts is a per se violation of the
implied warranty of habitability. In Trentacost v. Brussel,99 the New
Jersey Supreme Court held a landlord negligent for failing to se-
cure the front entrance of an apartment building after an intruder
mugged a sixty-one year old female tenant in the hallway.29 The
court proposed breach of the implied warranty of habitability as an
alternative theory.2 '1 The court noted that tenants reasonably ex-
pect they will receive "quarters suitable for living purposes 2 2 and
"facilities vital to the use of the premises."20 3 Moreover, echoing the
reasoning in Kline, the court noted the impracticality of requiring a
tenant to provide such security measures because no individual
tenant has control over common areas and, in a mobile society, no
tenant should be required to invest the money required.0 4 There-
fore, the doctrine of IWH "obliges [the landlord] to furnish
reasonable safeguards to protect tenants from foreseeable criminal
activity on the premises.
2 0 5
195. 901 S.W.2d 63 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995).
196. Id. at 74.
197. Id. at 67.
198. 741 F Supp. 1205, 1206 (D.S.C. 1990).
199. 412A.2d 436 (N.J. 1980).
200. Id. at 438.
201. Id. at 443.
202. Id. at 442 (quoting Marini v. Ireland, 265 A.2d 526, 533 (1970)).
203. Id. (quoting Marini, 265 A.2d at 534 (imposing the IW-H on New Jersey residential
leases)).
204. Id. at 442.
205. Id. at 443. Although the court later limited Trentacost to dangers the landlord was
aware of, this poses no problem for a harassed tenant because the landlord would have en-
gaged in the behavior himself. Ruiz v. Kaprelian, 731 A.2d 118, 122 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
1999).
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Moreover, courts that have narrowly defined "safe" to be about
structural defects rather than overall tenant safety have done so in
the context of determining landlord liability for the criminal acts
of third parties where the conduct was not foreseeable. 6 These
courts limit "safe" to concern health and safety codes and sanitary
conditions. In doing so, these courts ignore the overall purpose
behind the regulations: to protect the general health and well-
being of tenants who are unable to individually bargain for these
goods themselves. A tenant depends upon a landlord to act in her
interest so as to protect her from unknown dangers, whether those
dangers are a leaky roof or an unlocked door. Structural defects
relate to safety and in some cases are interchangeable. Faulty wir-
ing is illegal not because it is unsightly, but because it presents a
fire risk that can lead to lost lives as well as property damage. Nar-
rowly defining "safe" in this way may reflect more of a reluctance to
impose responsibility for overall "crime control" upon landlords2
07
and a concern with higher rental costs ultimately being passed on
to the tenant.
2 0 8
In addition to requiring landlords to provide "safe" premises by
preventing the foreseeable criminal acts of third parties or by not
creating dangers themselves, landlords must also not provide hous-
ing that they know contains lead paint.209 Although lead paint poses
health risks, especially to young children, the presence of lead
paint in and of itself is not a structural defect in the same sense as a
faulty wire. The tenant could still reside in the premises, unlike
premises with a defective sanitation system, because lead paint does
206. See, e.g., Deem v. Charles E. Smith Mgmt., Inc., 799 F.2d 944, 946 (4th Cir. 1986)
("The Virginia Residential Landlord and Tenant Act does not define a 'safe condition' ...
or 'safety'.... We believe, however, that those terms refer to the protection of the tenant
from injuries caused by failures of the building--collapsing stairs, faulty walls, dangerous
windows."); Williams v. William J. Davis, Inc., 275 A.2d 231, 232 (D.C. 1971) ("The terms
'safe' and 'safety' when used in the Regulations refer to safety from structural defects, un-
sanitary conditions, fire hazards, and the like, and have no application to safety from
criminal acts of third parties."); Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104, 107 (N.H.
1993) ("We hold that the w-arranty of habitability implied in residential lease agreements
protects tenants against structural defects, but does not require landlords to take affirmative
measures to provide security against criminal attack.").
207. For a more detailed discussion, see Glesner, supra note 158 (criticizing what the au-
thor feels is a trend toward increasing liability on landlords instead of what should be more
appropriately dealt with by the police).
208. Deem, 799 F.2d at 946 ("If landlords face such liability, tenant safety might be
greater, but rents may be higher, and apartment units, especially in urban centers, may be-
come more scarce.").
209. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4852d(2)(1)(B) (2001) (requiring that landlords provide notice to
renters about the presence of any known lead paint in properties). For an overview of fed-
eral and state legislation concerning lead paint, see Shana R. Cappell, Lead Paint Poisoning
and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act: A New Partnership for the Twenty-First Century, 35
COLUM.J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 175, 178-80 (2002).
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not compromise the safety or health of anyone else not living in
the unit.
Imposing liability on landlords for the foreseeable criminal be-
havior of third parties and the presence of lead paint in the home
not only indicates a growing recognition that housing means "safe"
housing, but it is also consistent with the trend away from the gen-
eral principle of "caveat emptor," or, in this case, "caveat rentor." A
tenant is no longer expected to be aware of hidden defects in the
premises and can no longer waive the implied warranty of habita-
bility in the majority ofjurisdictions.210 Therefore, the expansion of
the IWH to include the freedom from sexual harassment is consis-
tent with the recognition that housing is not merely four walls and
a ceiling, but must also be a home that does not threaten the ten-
ant's health or safety.
3. The Implied Warranty of Freedom from Sexual Harassment-
Extending the implied warranty of habitability to include an
environment free of sexual harassment is consistent with the policy
behind the IWH. Although many courts require a housing code
violation for a tenant to claim breach of the IWH, this conflicts with
general contract principles. It is also symptomatic of the
confusion within landlord-tenant law surrounding the dual
conveyance/contract nature of a lease. 1
According to Edward Chase and E. Hunter Taylor, Jr., even
though courts originally defined implied warranty of habitability as
a contractual matter, many analyze it less stringently than they
would a contract.2 2 As they note, "property analysis imposes a more
demanding standard of material breach than does contract law."
213
In their opinion, the doctrine's growth has been retarded because
the IWH is still within the context of property thinking.214 To
illustrate their point, Chase and Taylor claim that the IWH could
have developed in three ways. First, courts could have treated a
lease like any other contract and extended the abatement remedy
to any material breach of the contract.2 15 Second, abatement could
be available only for material breaches affecting the habitability,
based on the circumstances surrounding the lease and the parties'
210. But seeBedell v. Los Zapatistas, Inc., 805 P.2d 1198 (Colo. Ct. App. 1991); Holmes v.
Rosner, 346 S.E.2d 37 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986).
211. Chase & Taylor, supra note 158, at 693.
212. Id. at 642-65.
213. Id. at 615.
214. Id. at 642.
215. Id. at 644.
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expectations of what habitability of the premises included.2 6 Third,
the IWH could cover only bare minimum standards, so that
abatement can only be used in cases where such minimums do not
exist.2 17 As Chase and Taylor note, courts have by and large chosen
the third route.1 8
In evaluating a breach of contract, the starting point for the
remedy should be the expectations of the parties. Landlord and
tenant receive and expect different things. While the landlord
views the rental as a business transaction, the tenant sees the lease
as a promise to maintain a home.
To the landlord, renting is a financial transaction within a larger
investment. The landlord earns profits and receives tax breaks,
such as the ability to deduct "wear and tear" costs of the building
over twenty-seven-and-a-half years as depreciation. 219 Additionally, if
the landlord borrowed money to purchase the property, any
amount of money he spends to pay off the interest can count as a
deduction.220 Finally, the landlord may be entitled to a mortgage
interest deduction if he lives in the building and may face no tax
on income from its sale.22'
The tenant, on the other hand, gains none of these advantages.
She cannot deduct interest from mortgage payments as a home-
owner can. Although the landlord risks that the property
investment might fail, an especially grave consequence if the land-
lord depends on the property to make a living, it is still a business
transaction. By contrast, the lease is about a combination of goods
and services for the tenant and is ultimately about a home, not
simply a physical structure that temporarily changes hands.
By suggesting sex in exchange for rent or taking advantage of a
tenant, a landlord commits an illegal act, changes the entire nature
of the transaction, and yet expects the harassed tenant to uphold
her original agreement. Not merely incidental, the IWH is the cen-
terpiece of the transaction.2  A rental space means little if it is
216. Id.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 646.
219. 26 U.S.C. § 168(c) (2002).
220. 26 U.S.C. § 163(a) (2002).
221. 26 U.S.C. §§ 121 (a), 163(h) (3) (A) (2002) (providing that up to $250,000 for indi-
viduals and $500,000 for couples filing jointly on the sale of a primary residence may be
excluded from gross income for federal tax income purposes).
222. Critics of the implied warranty of habitability argue that requiring base line hous-
ing standards can ultimately hurt low income tenants by removing housing options from the
market; instead, tenants should be free to negotiate for lower rents in exchange for renting
housing that is not perfect. See, e.g., Charles J. Meyers, The Covenant of Habitability and the
American Law Institute, 27 STAN. L. Rv. 879, 889 (1975). However, unlike a broken window
or a leaky faucet, sexual harassment is outside of the market. But see Anthony T. Kronman,
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unsafe and uninhabitable. Therefore, allowing a harassed tenant to
use the IWFSH provides her with non-judicial recourse to stop the
behavior. Also, unlike a breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment,
the IWFSH does not require that the harassed tenant leave the
premises.
C. Using IWH Offensively
In addition to providing a tenant with a shield- a source of pro-
tection against unfair landlord actions- the implied warranty of
habitability also serves as a sword that the tenant may use offen-
sively to sue for damages.223 Courts have allowed the offensive use
of the IWH by finding that since the lease is a contract, damages
are available for breach. 24 As the Appellate Court of Illinois recog-
nized, "[it would be an anomalous result to deny a tenant a
remedy when he has paid his rent where, on the other hand, he
could use the breach of the implied warranty as a defense in a suit
for rent brought by the landlord. 225 In this way, the IWH is a flexi-
ble remedy. It presents the tenant with several options: withhold
rent to force the landlord to change his behavior, employ the IWH
as a counterclaim to the landlord's eviction action, or use the IWIH
offensively to sue the landlord for breach of the IWH and to obtain
damages. However, several courts have noted that the tenant must
choose either rent abatement or sue for breach.2 6
Most courts require a tenant to notify the landlord with actual or
constructive notice of the defect and provide some reasonable
time to repair before claiming breach of the IWH. 27 Courts are
Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 766 (1983) (acknowledging the implied
warranty of habitability as a "paternalistic restriction on contractual freedom," but arguing
for its necessity on the basis of economic efficiency and distributive justice).
223. George Washington Univ. v. Weintraub, 458 A.2d 43, 46 (D.C. 1983) (noting that
"the implied warranty of habitability may be used as a sword [as well as a shield]"). For a
more in-depth discussion of this case, see C. Stephen Lawrence, George Washington Univ. v.
Weintraub: Implied Warranty of Habitability As a (Ceremonial?) Sword, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 1137
(1984).
224. Weintraub, 458 A.2dat 46; Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa 1972); Fair v.
Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. 1978).
225. Jarrell v. Hartman, 363 N.E.2d 626, 628 (Ill. App. Ct. 1977).
226. E.g., Weintraub, 458 A.2d at 46.
227. See Id. at 48; see also Copeland v. People's Say. Bank, No. CV87-23-90-76-5, 1993 WL
55284 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 16, 1993) (holding that tenant must prove landlord has actual
or constructive notice of presence of lead paint); Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 797 (Iowa
1972) (finding that tenant must give landlord notice of the defects); Dwyer v. Skyline
Apartments, Inc., 301 A.2d 463 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1973), affd 311 A.2d 1 (N.J. 1973)
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reluctant to impose strict liability upon a landlord for a condition
that he may not know exists, whereas a tenant living in the
premises is in the best position to see such defects and
communicate them to the landlord. Unlike a tenant, a landlord
may not be intimately aware of structural changes in the
apartment, such as a ceiling that begins to leak. However, this
additional requirement upon tenants is inconsistent with contract
principles. As the court in Jarrell noted, "[i] t would be strange
indeed to require a tenant to give a landlord notice of what the law
is with reference to the landlord's duty or duties ... we are
unaware of any common law contract principle which requires the
nonbreaching party to fulfill such conditions precedent prior to
suit against the breaching party."2 s Therefore, the imposition of
notice is another example, as Chase and Taylor claim, of courts
categorizing a residential lease as a contract but then imposing
different, non-contractual requirements upon the tenant.
Unlike a defective pipe or peeling paint, a harassing landlord is
aware of sexual harassment because he is the one creating the de-
fect. However, given that sexual harassment cases are fact-sensitive,
often requiring the fact-finder to decipher the evidence cast in "he
said, she said" terms,2 9 the harassed tenant should notify her land-
lord of the unwelcome conduct. This will serve to deter such
behavior from recurring or escalating. Also, notice helps the ten-
ant combat a problem of proof at court; a certified letter to the
landlord (with a copy kept for herself) or a third-party witness
would surely prove persuasive.
(denying recovery to tenant injured by defective hot water faucet because landlord had no
knowledge of the latent defect); Winston Props. v. Sanders, 565 N.E.2d 1280 (Ohio Ct. App.
1989) (holding that landlord needs to have actual or constructive knowledge of the pres-
ence of lead paint, notjust peeling paint); Fair v. Negley, 390 A.2d 240 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1978)
(stating that tenant must give landlord notice of defective conditions); State Farm Fire &
Casualty Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 276 N.W.2d 349 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979) (allowing tenant to
recover damages for personal property losses caused by frozen plumbing where landlord
had notice of the defective condition).
228. Jarrell v. Hartman, 363 N.E.2d 626, 628 (11. App. Ct. 1977) (finding that tenant
does not need to give the landlord notice and the chance to repair before claiming a breach
of the IWH); see also Bencosme v. Kokoras, 507 N.E.2d 748, 749 (Mass. 1987) (finding that
the landlord does need to be aware of the presence of lead paint, but can be held strictly
liable for its presence when children under six live at the premises).
229. For court treatment of "he said, she said" dilemmas in employment cases, see Ca-
siano v. AT&T Corp., 213 F.3d 278, 285 (5th Cir. 2000) ("In this evenly balanced, no-other-
evidence, 'he said/she said' case, either party could prevail at trial, depending solely on
which one the trier of fact believes after hearing the testimony and observing the demeanors
of the protagonists on the witness stand."); Kunin v. Sears Roebuck & Co. 175 E3d 289, 292
(3d Cir. 1999) ("Although stating that the evidence supporting Kunin's claims did not ap-
pear 'overwhelming,' the court found that because many of the issues boiled down to 'he
said, she said' disputes, the entry of summaryjudgment was inappropriate.").
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D. IWFSH as Per Se Intentional Infliction
of Emotional Distress
Sexual harassment as a breach of the implied warranty of habi-
tability should also qualify as per se intentional infliction of
emotional distress ("IIED"). The prima facie elements of a claim
for intentional infliction of emotional distress are "(1) outrageous
conduct by the defendant, (2) intention to cause or reckless disre-
gard of the probability of causing emotional distress, (3) severe
emotional suffering and (4) actual and proximate causation of the
emotional distress."'2 30 In discussing a breach of the implied war-
ranty of habitability, courts have found landlords liable for
intentional infliction of emotional distress where they had knowl-
edge of the defect and did nothing to correct it or where they
abused their position of power over the tenant. Furthermore, land-
lords have been held liable for IIED for general harassment of a
tenant. One court has also suggested the use of IIED in sexual har-
assment claims. 231 Therefore, combining courts' treatment of IIED
in harassment claims with the possibility that a breach of implied
warranty can constitute IIED means that a landlord's sexual har-
assment of a tenant qualifies as per se intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
Not only have some courts allowed damages for intentional
infliction of emotional distress when the landlord abused his or
her position of power over the tenant, but others have found IIED
based on a breach of the implied warranty of habitability where the
landlord knew of a defect and failed to remedy it. In Fair v. Negley,
the Pennsylvania Superior Court recognized that a breach of the
IWH may qualify as IIED due to the power imbalance between
landlord and tenant. 32 Pointing to the Restatement (Second) of
Torts, the court noted that the commentary to section 46 states
that the "extreme and outrageous character of the conduct may
arise from an abuse by the actor of a position, or a relation with the
other, which gives him actual or apparent authority over the other,
or power to affect his interests."23 3 The Restatement then cites
230. Newby v. Alto Riveria Apartments, 131 Cal. Rptr. 547 (Ct. App. 1976), rev'd on other
grounds, by Marina Point Ltd. v. Wilson, 180 Cal. Rptr. 496 (Ct. App. 1982) (overruling
Newby's treatment of California's Unruh Act).
231. See text accompanying notes 238-41.
232. 390 A.2d 240, 246 (Pa. Super Ct. 1978).
233. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 46 cmt. e (1965).
WiNrrm 2005]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
landlords as an example of such a position .23' Finally, the Court
noted that a landlord had been held liable for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for wrongful eviction after tenants
complained of needed repairs and the landlord responded by
raising the rent by an unreasonable amount.25 Similarly, in
Grundberg v. Gill, the Massachusetts Appeals Court found for
tenants claiming breach of the IWH and IIED after the landlord
refused to repair a septic tank that had flooded into the house and
prevented the tenants from being able to use water. 6 The trial
judge described the situation as "abominable" and "outrageous"
and the cause of emotional distress to the tenants because
the landlord knew of the situation for over seventeen months
and did nothing to remedy it.
237
Landlords have also been held liable for intentional infliction of
emotional distress for harassment. For example, in Newby v. Alto
Riviera Apartments, two building managers threatened a tenant with
eviction after she gathered other tenants' signatures for a petition
calling for a meeting with the owner to discuss a proposed rent in-
crease.238 One manager gave Ms. Newby three days to vacate the
premises.239 Although noting that "mere insulting language, with-
out more, [did] not constitute outrageous conduct" under the
Restatement, the Court still found the harassment qualified as in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress due to the nature of the
landlord-tenant relationship.24 The Court defined outrageous be-
havior under the IIED as when "a defendant (1) abuses a relation
or position which gives him power to damage the plaintiffs inter-
est; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental
distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recogni-
tion that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental
distress."24' The Court found that the "insulting language was part
of a course of harassing, humiliating, and intimidating conduct."
242
It also regarded the behavior as outrageous because the defendants
234. Id.
235. Fair, 390 A.2d at 246 (citing Aweeka v. Bonds, 97 Cal. Rptr. 650 (Cal. Ct. App.
1971)).
236. No. 99-P-1 390, 2002 WL 31834779 (Mass. App. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002).
237. Id. The Court granted treble damages for both the IWH breach and the lIED. Id.
238. 131 Cal. Rptr. 547, 550 (Ct. App. 1976).
239. Id. at 553.
240. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46(d) (1965)).
241. Id. at 553, (citing PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 57-58 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS, § 46(e), (f) (1965)).
242. Id. at 554.
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"acted knowingly and unreasonably with the intention to inflict
mental distress.,
243
More specifically in the sexual harassment context, the tenant in
Raune v. Murray alleged intentional infliction of emotional distress
on the basis that the landlord knew she suffered from psychologi-
cal problems and that he used this knowledge to take advantage of
244her. Upon entering the plaintiffs apartment to collect rent one
month, the landlord made sexual advances to Ms. Raune. In re-
sponse to the stress, Ms. Raune entered a "disassociate state" that
the landlord used as his opportunity to sleep with her.245 After the
incident, the landlord continued to harass Ms. Raune and even
used his master key to enter her apartment. 46 Eventually Ms.
Raune called the police for assistance.2 47 In reversing summary
judgment for the landlord, the South Dakota Supreme Court
hinted that another possible basis for an IIED claim was the land-
lord's abuse of his position of power under the Restatement, rather
than his knowledge of the plaintiffs mental state.244
A landlord's sexual harassment of a tenant qualifies as per se in-
tentional infliction of emotional distress because, like Grinberg and
Newby, it is done with the landlord's personal knowledge. The land-
lord's sexual harassment qualifies as both outrageous and extreme
because the landlord abuses his position of power over the tenant.
The threat of eviction over a tenant is great. Finally, the landlord's
actions are intentional. The landlord knows that threatening evic-
tion or even significantly changing the tenant's living circumstances
by not making repairs will have immediate and important effects
upon the tenant. In addition, pursuing a claim of IIED under
breach of the IWH allows for the possibility of punitive damages
based on breach of contract.
2 49
243. Id. at 553.
244. 380 N.W.2d 362 (S.D. 1986), overruled ly Bass v. Happy Rest. Inc., 507 N.W.2d 317
(S.D. 1993) (determining what qualifies as intentional infliction of emotional distress).
245. Id. at 363.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 364.
249. Miller v. C.W. Myers Trading Post, Inc., 355 S.E.2d 189, 195 (N.C. Ct. App. 1987)
(rejecting claim for punitive damages based on implied warranty of habitability when the
breach neither constitutes nor is accompanied by tortious conduct); H & R Bernstein v.
Barrett, 421 N.Y.S.2d 511, 513 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1979) (holding that damages for breached war-
ranty of habitability cannot include damages for embarrassment or anxiety); Hilder v. St.
Peter, 478 A.2d 202, 210 (Vt. 1984) (finding that damages may be awarded for the tenant's
discomfort or annoyance caused by the breach and that punitive damages may be appropri-
ate when there is a willful and wanton or fraudulent breach, demonstrated "by conduct
manifesting personal ill will, or carried out under circumstances of insult or oppression, or
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E. Lease Notice Provision
To inform tenants of their rights as well as to put landlords on
notice, all leases should state that sexual harassment is a violation
of the lease, in a manner similar to the current requirement that
landlords disclose the dangers of lead paint.20 This notice would
provide a tenant with a list of options she can pursue if she is being
harassed. The notice would also contain the contact information of
where a tenant may call if she faces a sexual harassment problem,
such as a local legal services organization that is well-informed re-
garding housing sexual harassment and prepared to handle
questions and complaints. 251 The sexual harassment addendum
would be a separate part of the lease, thereby calling special atten-
tion to it, in a manner similar to the current lead paint disclosure
statement.
252
even by conduct manifeseting... a reckless or wanton disregard of [one's] rights"); cf. Allen
v. Simmons, 394 S.E.2d 478 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (denying tenant's claim for intentional
infliction for emotional distress because she failed to make out a cause of damages). In Al-
len, the tenant argued that she suffered emotional distress as a result of being "trapped in
[a] situation with malfunctioning plumbing, no heat, rats and dangerously defective wiring."
Id. Furthermore, the landlord intended to cause distress because he continued to demand
rent even after three city orders condemned the property. Id. at 484.
250. The Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992 requires land-
lords to inform tenants of any "known" dangers of lead paint in the unit, and provide any
inspection records concerning the presence of lead paint and an EPA approved pamphlet
detailing the dangers of lead paint. 42 U.S.C. § 4851 (1992).
251. See, e.g., Charles Laszewski, Minnesota, U.S. Agencies are Faulted in Tenant-Harassment
Cases, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Aug. 26, 2002, at BI available at 2002 WL 26062259 (noting
specific examples of legal services attorneys in Minnesota who have experience, or work
exclusively with tenants facing sexual harassment at home).
252. The federal lead paint disclosure addendum to the lease provides:
Addendum to Lease Agreement between parties signed on _ [date], pertain-
ing to the lease of property at ___ [address], _ [city], _ County,
__ [state].
LEAD WARNING STATEMENT
Housing built before 1978 may contain lead-based paint, paint chips, and dust, which
can pose health hazards if not managed properly. Lead exposure is especially harmful
to young children and pregnant women. Before renting pre- 1978 housing, landlords
must disclose the presence of known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint haz-
ards in the dwelling. Tenants must also receive a federally-approved pamphlet on lead
poisoning prevention.
LANDLORD'S INITIAL DISCLOSURE
(a) Presence of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards (check one below):
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A sample IWFSH notice statement might provide:
"Sexual harassment of a tenant by a landlord, building man-
ager, or any other agent(s) of the property owner is a material
breach of this lease. It interferes with the enjoyment of the
property and the ability of the tenant to feel safe in the home.
A tenant who feels he or she has been harassed has three op-
tions:
1. withhold rent to stop the behavior and give reason(s) for
the lack of rent payment(s);
[ ] Known lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards are present in the hous-
ing.
[ ] Landlord has no knowledge of lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards
in the housing.
(b) Records and reports available to the landlord (check one below):
[ J Landlord has provided the tenant with all available records and reports pertaining
to lead-based paint and/or lead-based paint hazards in the housing. List documents:
[ Landlord has no reports or records pertaining to lead-based paint and/or lead-
based paint hazards in the housing.
TENANT'S INITIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
(c) [ ] Tenant has received copies of all information listed under (b) above.
(d) [ ] Tenant has received the pamphlet "Protect Your Family from Lead in Your
Home."
REAL ESTATE LICENSEE'S INITIAL ACKNOWLEDGMENT
(e) [ I Real estate licensee has informed the landlord of the landlord's obligations
under the Residential Lead-Based Paint Hazard Reduction Act of 1992, and is aware
of licensee's responsibility to ensure compliance.
CERTIFICATION OF AccuRACY
The following parties have reviewed the information above and certify, to the best of
their knowledge, that the information provided by the signatory is true and accurate.
[Signatures]
1IB AM.JUR. 2D Leases of Real Property § 161:1089 (2003).
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2. sue the landlord for breach of the lease to recover dam-
ages; or
3. notify the landlord that if the situation is not corrected
within a reasonable amount of time, a termination of the
lease without any further obligations will result.
This should be done as soon as possible, preferably in writing.
A tenant who feels he or she is being harassed may contact
the following agencies for assistance."
Finally, the tenant could also be provided with an informational
pamphlet discussing sexual harassment in more detail. 53
The very act of providing notice alerts a landlord that a tenant is
aware that sexual harassment is a breach of the lease. Therefore, it
may discourage the landlord from sexually harassing tenants. Addi-
tionally, the notice aspect of the implied warranty of freedom from
sexual harassment (IWFSH) educates the public about the exis-
tence of the problem. As a result, if a tenant sees the landlord
sexually harassing a fellow tenant, the neighbor can assist by acting
as a witness or by telling the harassed tenant where she can get
help. By publicly condemning sexual harassment of tenants by
landlords, written notice could help to remove some of the shame
sexual harassment victims feel. It may encourage those who are
being sexually harassed to challenge the landlord or, at the very
least, to no longer suffer in isolation. This "community awareness"
aspect could also help expose landlords who harass more than one
tenant.
Some may argue that providing notice defeats the "implied" na-
ture of the IWFSH. Although in theory the freedom from sexual
harassment, as it is an implied warranty, should not have to be
stated, the addendum does not defeat the implied nature of the
warranty. Instead, notice of the IWFSH gives information about the
expected behavior of the parties, in a similar fashion to the current
practice of leases stating that a landlord must provide adequate
heat. In this way, the notice works in tandem with, rather than de-
feats, the "implied" nature of the implied warranty.
253. For an example of a guide to further resources and general information about
sexual harassment, see LEGAL MOMENTUM (formerly NOW Legal Defense & Educ. Fund),
LEGAL RESOURCE KIT: SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN HOUSING (2003), at http://
www.legalmomentum.org/issues/vio/FactsheetPage.shtml (on file with the University of
MichiganJournal of Law Reform).
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E Future Deterrence
An effort must be made to deter landlords from sexually harass-
ing tenants. Although criminalizing sexual harassment recognizes
it as a societal harm and may provide more exposure to the prob-
lem, a better option is the temporary suspension of a landlord's
rental license.
Having a criminal sanction involves the state as an advocate for
the tenant and provides the tenant with a guide through the legal
system; however, this potential solution may solidify the loss of con-
trol the tenant feels because she will have no control over the
direction of the prosecution. From a practical standpoint, criminal-
izing harassment will depend on the police and local prosecutor
for enforcement. In comparison to violent crimes like murder,
sexual harassment may likely be low on the enforcer's list of priori-
ties, especially in a "high crime" area. Police sensitivity and
educational training would also be necessary, similar to that
needed for other "sensitive" crimes such as rape and domestic vio-
lence. Finally, any fine that results from a criminal charge goes to
the state, not the victim. Ultimately, the victim is left with having
possibly lost rent money she already paid for a place of no value
along with now having no place to live.
Currently, an approach under civil law better serves the harassed
tenant. Once a court finds that the landlord sexually harassed a
tenant, the landlord's ability to collect rent from all of the proper-
ties should be temporarily suspended for a period of one to three
months. Other tenants should be notified of the finding of har-
assment.1 4 However, in determining the amount of time, the court
should consider how suspending the landlord's power to collect
rent might compromise his ability to compensate the harassed ten-
ant, which would be the primary goal.
Ultimately, the temporary rental license suspension approach
serves three purposes. First, it will deter the landlord from
engaging in such behavior again. Second, it sends a message to
other landlords that sexual harassment will not be tolerated and
could have serious financial consequences.2 5 Third, suspending
254. A discussion of the possible due process implications this might raise is beyond the
scope of this Article.
255. Although several states have provisions revoking the licenses of professionals for
sexual harassment, none concerns property owners. See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. tit. 59,
§ 1370 (A) (6) (Supp. 1994) (relating to psychiatrists); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 36-4-29, -30
(1992) (revoking a physician's license for sexual harassment); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 541
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the landlord's ability to collect rent from all properties, rather than
just the harassed tenant, emphasizes that sexual harassment is a
societal harm.
Revoking the landlord's license temporarily, rather than perma-
nently, recognizes the importance of deterrence while at the same
time does not compromise other tenants' housing. The landlord
who sexually harasses a tenant needs to be punished for violating
that tenant's right to safe housing. Nevertheless, this needs to be
balanced with other tenants' rights to safe housing. If a landlord's
rental license were revoked altogether, the landlord could not col-
lect rent and would most likely stop maintaining the premises. If a
harassed tenant knew this would be the likely consequence of rais-
ing a sexual harassment complaint, the tenant might choose to
suffer harassment in silence rather than risk hurting her
neighbors. This potential negative effect on neighbors as innocent
third parties also defeats the overall purpose of emphasizing sexual
harassment as a societal harm.
CONCLUSION
Tenants enduring sexual harassment must have an immediate
remedy that does not require litigation. The FHA fails this test.
Some may argue that a shift away from bringing sexual harassment
claims under the Fair Housing Act is not only too late, but that do-
ing so may deprive tenants of any remedy the F1-A may potentially
provide. Although it is true that several jurisdictions recognize a
cause of action for sexual harassment under the FHA, the simple
fact remains that few individual tenants have successfully brought
claims.25 6 Additionally, courts have rejected tenants' attempts to
have their sexual harassment claims evaluated independently of
the Title VII framework.257 Tenants lose because the FHA is inade-
(Supp. 1993) (disciplinary proceedings or revocation possible penalties for chiropractor);
D.C. Code Ann. § 2-3305.14 (1994) (revoking health care professional's license for sexual
harassment). For further discussion of possible penalties to professionals for harassment, see
Baker, supra note 193.
256. See Laszewski, supra note 251, at 5 (noting that of the 214 fair housing cases the
Department ofJustice filed from 1997 to 2002, only nine concerned sexual harassment and
noting that HUD resolves tenants claims in their favor 47 percent of the time).
257. See, e.g., Grieger v. Sheets, No. 87 C 6567, 1989 WL 38707, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Ill. Apr.
10, 1989) ("Sheets argues that it is inappropriate to rely on Title VII cases like Meritor for the
standards to apply in this Title VIII case. See Def.'s Reply at 3 n.1. However, both Title VII
and Title VIII have the purpose of outlawing discrimination based on race, religion, na-
tional origin, and sex.").
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quate and ill-suited to deal with the problem of sexual harassment.
It neither addresses the problem nor provides an adequate remedy.
Sexual harassment in housing needs to be re-evaluated because
the FHA also affects state claims. To date, thirty-four states cur-
rently have fair housing laws that are "substantially equivalent to
Title VII."255 Although state law pre-empts the FHA whenever there
is a state statute that provides remedies that are equal to or greater
than the federal remedy,"' state courts have often looked to the
federal courts' interpretation of the FHA in order to construe state
laws with similar provisions. For example, in evaluating whether
the Illinois Human Relations Act prohibits sexual harassment, the
Illinois Court of Appeals first noted that the state law "closely paral-
lels" § 3604 (b) of the FHA and then used the framework for
evaluating sexual harassment claims begun in Shellhammer . 26 Simi-
larly, the California Court of Appeals looked to § 3604 of the FlA
to interpret the state's Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) .26 In this way, it is likely that whichever remedy a tenant
pursues-either under the FHA or a state statute-she will encoun-
ter the same way of evaluating the issue. Therefore, sexual
harassment jurisprudence in the context of housing needs to be re-
evaluated.
In adjudicating sexual harassment housing claims, the need to
rely on Title VII arose from the fact there is no general law
prohibiting sexual harassment. As Catherine MacKinnon has
noted, sexual harassment is "a woman's common law" that
developed from the courts rather than from a mobilized social
consciousness. 62 By concentrating on crafting specific sexual
harassment rules for different contexts rather than having an
overall rule, society, and women in particular, are dependent on
the judiciary to transfer sexual harassment jurisprudence from one
258. ROBERT G. SCHWEMM, HOUSING DISCRIMINATION LAW AND LITIGATION app. C, at
1 (Supp. 2004) (listing Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida,
Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachu-
setts, Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia as those states with similar statutes).
259. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 3610(d), 3612(a) (2000).
260. Szkoda v. Ill. Human Rights Comm'n, 706 N.E.2d 962, 968 (Ill. App. Ct. 1998).
261. Brown v. Smith, 64 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 305 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Although FEHA for-
bids sexual discrimination in housing, it does not enumerate sexual harassment as a type of
discrimination subject to FEHA .... Since FEHA is remedial legislation which should be
broadly construed to accomplish its stated purposes, and which should be read in confor-
mity with federal housing law, we conclude the trial court did not err in making that
determination.").
262. MacKinnon, supra note 22, at 815, 817.
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context to another. This "borrowing" comes with disadvantages, as
the imperfections in existing interpretations are transferred and
thereby perpetuated. When a sexual harassment framework is
transferred wholesale from one context to another-from the
workplace under Title VII to the home under Title VIII to
education under Title IX-existing biases are transferred as well.
Nor does such wholesale transfer recognize the factual differences
between the situations. Therefore, society would benefit from a law
that prohibits sexual harassment in all contexts on the basis of
equality.
263
In the meantime, defining sexual harassment as a breach of the
implied warranty of habitability-the implied warranty of freedom
from sexual harassment ("IWFSH")-provides one promising ave-
nue for relief. It gives the tenant the option to withhold rent or
assert the breach offensively. In this way, it attempts to restore some
of the lost sense of control the tenant experiences. Additionally,
given the egregious and malicious nature of sexual harassment, it
also qualifies as per se intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Finally, by including a separate lease provision and removing the
landlord's ability to collect rent from the rental properties for a
period of time in the event of a finding of liability, it demonstrates
to landlords that society will not tolerate such behavior.
The courts' failure to acknowledge sexual harassment in rental
housing exposes society's reluctance to address issues of equality
for those whom the problem affects most: women, the poor, and
people of color. Additionally, any argument advancing a tenant's
right to live free from sexual harassment evokes notions of what
right, if any, to housing exists. Thus far, the United States has been
reluctant to recognize housing as a civil or human right, but in-
stead has focused on the problem of homelessness.264 Therefore, in
order for tenants to be successful in promoting their right to live
free from sexual harassment, the best course of action at present is
to rely on the implied warranty of habitability in those jurisdictions
that have already recognized that housing is more than four walls
and a ceiling and that landlords have responsibilities beyond con-
veying living space.
263. For a discussion of Israel's recent adoption of a sexual harassment law and how it
differs from that of United States, see Tzili Mor, Law as a Tool for a Sexual Revolution: Israel's
Prevention of Sexual Harassment Law--1998,7 MICH.J. GENDER & L. 291 (2001).
264. CurtisJ. Berger, Beyond Homelessness: An Entitlement to Housing, 45 U. MIAMI L. REV.
315 (1991) (arguing that proactive efforts need to be made in the United States to provide
affordable housing rather than simply reacting to the problem of homelessness and propos-
ing that affordable housing be seen as a fundamental right).
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